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ABSTRACT
DEMOCRATIC FAILURE:
TRACKING THE EBB OF DEMOCRACY'S FLOW, 1800-2006
Sonja E. Sray
Old Dominion University, 2008
Director: Dr. Kurt Taylor Gaubatz

Scant attention has focused on the systematic study of democratic failure. This
dissertation partially corrects this oversight. Tracing the roots of antidemocratic
sentiment across the centuries, it first argues that the advance of institutions, fueled by
underlying shifts in values and innovation in political philosophy, was key to freeing
democracy from its bondage as a most disparaged form of governance. Focusing on the
measurable aspects of these institutions, the study focuses on describing patterns of
behavior when democracies fail. First, it shows that there have been clusters of
democratic failure. These clusters, or counterwaves, find their roots in ancient
antidemocratic sentiment with modern ideological twists. The comparison of these
counterwaves helps illuminate threats to democracy present in antidemocratic ideals that
have held sway in the international system at varying times. Examining democratic
failures in high level democracies, mid-level democracies, and low level democracies, it
shows that democracies by and large fail quickly and dramatically. It highlights the issue
of repeat offenders, those democracies that repeatedly attempt "rule by the many" even
when plagued with democratic failure. Finally, it also shows the relevance of the
deepening of autocracy as it interacts with the idea of the failure of democracy.
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1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In the words of Anatole France, "All changes, even the most longed for, have
their melancholy; for what we leave behind us is a part of ourselves; we must die to one
life before we can enter another."1 At its heart, this dissertation is about change. While
France was clearly philosophizing about change impacting individuals, his words seem
apt for nation states as well. The process of changing one's political power configuration
is not without angst. This study looks at a particular aspect of change, one in which
states return to that which they left behind. To be more explicit, this is a study of nation
states that commit, on some level, to democratic governance only to backslide on their
commitments. It is the story of nations that, at least on some level, didn't die to one life
before entering another.
These renegade democracies cluster together at certain points in history. It's as if
they are collectively struck by a sort of melancholy with democratic progression, and turn
their backs on democracy en masse. Little has been said about this collective
commitment to democratic decline. Instead, attention has focused on democratic
progression. Samuel Huntington has quite famously described democracy's forward
march as a historic process of ever increasing waves.

He tracks 3 historic waves of

democracy, each involving more countries than the wave which preceded it.
This dissertation follows the format requirements of A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses and
Dissertations 7th edition by Kate L. Turabian.
1
Anatole France, http://thinkexist.com/quotation/all_changes-even_the_most_longed_forhave their/220920.html (accessed October 8, 2008).
2
Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

2
Why commit time to study the backward steps of this dance when the forward
motion seems dominant? Has not Western academia reached the rather solid conclusion
that democracy is inevitable, except perhaps for certain odd-ball regimes and extremist
religious cultures? True, the euphoria that immediately followed the Cold War's
dramatic conclusion has largely evaporated, as a forced to acknowledgement that the
process of democratic transition and consolidation has not been as Pollyannic as hoped.
Still, democracy remains the only legitimate form of governance, the evolutionary end
point, the signpost of a civilization's true arrival. Defeating all comers in the political
brawl across the centuries, today it is the last man standing. This work focuses on the
times democracy falters, stumbles, and even falls, because the picture of democracy's
success can only be understood against the backdrop of its failures.
Today democracy boasts the power to modify the actions of even the most
absolute dictator. Even highly autocratic regimes pay twisted homage to democracy by
holding "elections," which apparently must go on even in the wake of extreme natural
disasters.4 In some token way even these enemies of democracy confirm its power. Even
those societies that are not democratic often placate their populations with the succor of
economic transformation now, promising political transformation later. Few regimes
indeed dare to say that democracy is a flawed institution.
In the West democracy has been seen as a key to achieving a more peaceful
international system. The United States has identified democracy promotion as priority
number one in the foreign policy arena.5 In fact, all post-Cold war presidents, regardless
3

Larry Diamond, "Universal Democracy?" Policy Review 119 (June 2003): 3-25.
Seth Mydans, "Rulers Keep Grip on Aid as Burmese Cast Votes," New York Times, May 11, 2008.
5
Michael McFaul, "Democracy Promotion as a World Value," The Washington Quarterly 28, no. 1
(Winter 2004-2005): 147-163.
4

3

of party affiliation, have emphasized the promotion of democracy as a key foreign policy
objective. So drastic is this commitment that even the C.I.A. has apparently been
realigned to see democracy promotion as a prime objective.6 Meanwhile, the European
Union has pushed democracy as a necessary precursor for membership. While the
origins of the EU orbited around economic considerations, nations have been admitted
into membership when their economic outlook was far from certain.7 Less flexibility,
however, has been extended to nations with robust economies but damp commitment to
democracy.8 Democracy has served as the sine quo non for the EU states.
Nor is democracy confined to the geographic boundaries of Europe and North
America. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, nations turned to democracy like
refugees fleeing civil war. As early as the 1970s, Latin American nations turned toward
democratic reforms as well. African nations, in the wake of colonialism's death, initially
maintained the democratic institutions of their colonizers. Asia, too, is the home of
mature democracies. No continent, then, has been left untouched by democracy's
forward march.
So again, why bother with democratic decline? Democracy's advance, instead of
denigrating the need to study democratic decline, instead lends urgency. As the
international system has more of a stake in democratic progression, it has more of a stake
in preventing democratic decline. Understanding and describing democratic decline

William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy:

Globalization, U.S. Intervention, and Hegemony

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 231.
7
Susan Senior Nello, "Preparing for Enlargement in the European Union: The Tensions between
Economic and Political Integration," International Political Science Review 23, no. 3 (July 2002): 291 317.
8
Heather Grabbe, "European Union Conditionality and the 'Acquis Communautaire,"' International
Political Science Review 23, no. 3 (July 2002): 249-268.

4

becomes of vital interest to those who would defend democracy. Only by acquiring a
greater understanding of the threats to democracy can one truly bolster and defend it.

The Gap
Surprisingly, there has been little systematic work in this area. An examination of
the gap should precede the discussion of the meat of this study. The gap in the literature
is actually two-fold, existing both in the democratic failure literature as well as in the
treatment of clusters of democratic failure. This project aims to partially bridge this
double gap.
Democratic failure
It would be incorrect to assert that no one has given thought to why democracies
falter. There are several extant theories on democracy's demise. Some assert that
democracy fails when faced with outside security threats.9 It devolves into a type of
"garrison state" mentality that values security over democracy. Thus, democracy is
sacrificed at the altar of security when sufficient threats arise. In a slight variation of this
theme, others assert democracy is a luxury good only afforded by those states without the
pressures of trying to secure their borders.10 If one has a threatening neighbor,
democracy is likely to falter.
By other measures, democratic reforms fail when the elites from the former
political system are not assimilated into the new democracy, or at least duly compensated
9

Harold D. Lasswell, "The Garrison State," The American Journal of Sociology 46, no. 4 (January 1941):
455-468.
10
In his paper "Defensive Democratization" Kurt Taylor Gaubatz discusses this traditional viewpoint, then
shows its limitations. Please see Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Defensive Democratization: International
Relations Theory, Strategic Politicians, and External Incentives for Regime Change," unpublished
manuscript (Norfolk: Old Dominion University, 2008).

5

for sacrificing their power. This can be as simple as failing to ensure a "golden
parachute" to elites who have much to lose from a transition to democracy or can occur
when the complexities of the transition are bungled. n Heterogeneity of society has also
been associated with democratic failure. A society divided into many factions—whether
ethnic, cultural, political or religious—provides infertile ground for democracy's
growth.1
And, of course, there is the cultural argument. Some argue that democracy will
not flourish in certain environments, simply because the culture is hostile to the ideals
necessary for democracy.

These cultures have not cultivated the necessary "habits of

the heart" and thus democracy finds a hostile reception.
Democracy may also falter when it fails to meet up to domestic expectations.
Democracy is charged with making life better for all who live under it, improving the
condition of the poor, indeed acting as a savior for any number of problems in society.
Failure to meet these expectations has been linked with democratic failure in a variant of
Ted Robert Gurr's theory of the J curve.14
These works, however, are piecemeal in their approach, selecting a country or
grouping of countries upon which to base their assertions. Curiously the most prominent
book on the subject was written by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan nearly 30 years ago, in
11

Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security
20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 36-37.
12
James Ockey, "Political Parties, Factions, and Corruption in Thailand," Modern Asian Studies 28, no. 1
(May 1994): 251-277.
13
Howard J. Wiarda, The Soul of Latin America: The Cultural and Political Tradition (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2001), 309-343.
14
Ted Robert Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," World Politics 20, no. 2 (January 1968):
245-278.

the midst of the most sustained forward wave of democratization.

Even this tome only

dealt with selected cases in Latin America and Europe. Since that time, the case study
approach has dominated.16 The few cross-national analyses that exist deal with regional
17

considerations and not the system at large.

While the in-depth case study analyses and

regional studies have provided important insights, the lack of macro-level analysis of
democratic failure across time leaves a gap that needs to be filled. This focus on the trees
leaves little room for studying the forest. In the case of democratic failure, key findings
on the deforestation of democracy provide important insights into managing forest health.
It begins the process of guarding against the forest fires known also as the counterwaves,
a phenomenon impossible to even detect when focusing exclusively on case studies.
The counterwaves
While many of these theories of democratic failure bring insight, they are
primarily focused on internal dynamics. Perhaps this is only natural since the domestic
stories are so interesting. While you can't have a democratic demise without a domestic
story, the international component has been largely ignored. By implication, the
literature would have us believe the domestic story is the only story. These clusters of
democratic failure by their very presence imply an international component, and yet this
has received little attention.
15

Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1978).
16
For examples of the case study approach see: Robert Fatton Jr. "The Impairments of Democratization:
Haiti in Comparative Perspective," Comparative Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1999): 209-229; Paul
Zaforski, "Democratic Breakdown in Paraguay and Venezuela: The Shape of Things to come for Latin
America?" Armed Forces & Society 30, no. 1 (Fall 2003): 87-116; Vedi Hadiz, "Reorganizing Political
Power in Indonesia: a Reconsideration of so-called Democratic Transitions," The Pacific Review 16, no. 4
(December 2003): 591-611.
17
See, for example, Michael Bratton's "The 'Alternation Effect' in Africa," Journal of Democracy 15, no.
4 (October 2004): 147-158; Pat McGowan and Thomas H. Johnson, "African Military Coups-d'Etat and

7
In looking again to Huntington, we find he has dedicated a scant few pages to the
idea of the counterwaves, or democratic reversals that occur in clusters. He notes that
after each advance of democracy, there is a retraction of democracy.

And yet, by

implication if there are international components to democracy's advance, there seem
also to be international components to democracy's retreat.
Other scholars mention the counterwave phenomenon in a peripheral way. Larry
Diamond published an article entitled "Is Pakistan the (reverse) wave of the future?"19 In
it, he fretted that Pakistan's failure would kick off a grand counterwave, given its high
population, its status as a nuclear power, and its residence in a sensitive region. His
concern was also elevated by his prediction that the Pakistani government was unlikely to
recover democracy in the near future. And yet, in a subsequent article he largely laid
these concerns to rest, concluding that no antidemocratic ideology had emerged to
challenge democracy's normative hold.
Michael McFaul also flirted with the idea of a counterwave in his article "The 4l
•

wave of democracy and dictatorship."

91

He studied the transitions of post-communist

states and tracked their progress away from communism. He noted that in countries with
nearly equivalent power distributions between democrats and autocrats, protracted
confrontation, not democratization, resulted.
Underdevelopment: A Quantitative Historical Analysis," Journal of Modern African Studies 22, no. 4
(December 1984): 633-666.
18
Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman,
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 13-21.
19
Larry Diamond, "Is Pakistan the (Reverse) Wave of the Future?" Journal of Democracy 11, no. 3 (July
2000): 91-106.
20
Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?" Journal of Democracy 7, no. 3 (July 1996): 20-37.
21
Michael McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the
Postcommunist World," World Politics 54, no. 2 (January 2002): 212-244.

8

While Huntington, Diamond and McFaul all acknowledge the idea of the
counterwave, Renske Doorenspleet challenges the very existence of waves of
99

democratization.

This article critiques Huntingon's methodology in terms of his case

selection criteria. She asserts that Huntington focuses on some aspects of democracy,
such as competition, to the exclusion of other aspects of democracy, such as inclusion.
She critiques Huntington's demonstration of democratic momentum by arguing for a
methodology that includes the percentage of world states that are democracies. This is
central, she asserts, since the total number of states in the system hasn't remained
constant. If one takes these factors into account it leads to different outcomes, including
a diminished appearance of reverse waves. In other words, Doorenspleet argues that we
should raise the bar for defining democracy. In so doing, both waves and reverse waves
are less distinct. My approach, as discussed more fully in the section describing the
undergirding assumptions of this project, challenges Doorenspleet's notion that setting a
high bar for democracy is the best way to study its progression and regression.

Drawing on Related Literature
The gap in the literature surrounding democratic decline and failure and the gap in
the literature surrounding the counterwave are now evident. The related literature on
democratic transition and democratic consolidation feature fewer holes. An increasing
concern over the stalling of democratic reforms is particularly evident in the literature.
22

Renske Doorenspleet, "Reassessing the Three Waves of Democratization," World Politics 52, no. 3
(April 2000): 384-406.

9
While this literature doesn't alleviate the gap this work is addressing, it does provide a
related literature upon which to draw. As such, it deserves some discussion here.
Illiberal democracy and hybrid regimes
In a critical article, Thomas Carothers calls into question the legitimacy of the
democratic transition literature's assumptions.

He points out the overly optimistic

nature of much of the democratic transition and consolidation literature, accusing
advocates of democratization of being somewhat naive in their assessments. He finds
particular lack of support for the assumption that stalled democratization is an inherently
unstable position. He also challenges the assertion there are distinct stages to
democratization.
This concern is echoed in a growing literature concerned with illiberal
democracies and democracies, or those nations that seem to demonstrate Carothers' point
by stabilizing in their stalled semi-democratic state. In fact, there has been increasing
concern over the faltering democratization process in many countries. While the initial
assumption of many scholars of democratization was the expectation of a few bumps
along the pathway to democratic consolidation, reality is now forcing a different
perspective. Many regimes seem content with what Larry Diamond has called "hybrid
regime" status.24 While elections may be taking place at some level, these states do not
exhibit any motivation to continue on the path to full-fledged liberal democracy.25 This
23

Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 (January
2002): 5-21.
24
Larry Diamond, "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes," Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (April 2002): 2135.
25
Curtis Ryan and Jillian Schwedler, "Return to Democratization or New Hybrid Regime? The 2003
Elections in Jordon," Middle East Policy 11, no. 2 (June 2004): 138-151; Guillermo O'Donnell
"Delegative Democracy," Journal of Democracy 5, no. 1 (January 1994): 55-69; Jason Brownlee, "Low
Tide after the Third Wave: Exploring Politics under Authoritarianism," Comparative Politics 34, no. 4
(July 2002): 477-498.
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literature demonstrates the dawning realization that democratization has not proceeded in
the linear fashion envisioned by early democratic theorists.26 In fact, illiberal democracy,
usually as a result of democratic reversal, is a prevalent concern.

Concern is rising that

illiberal democracy may not be the inherently unstable entity it was once assumed to be,
but instead may rest quite comfortably in a political zone that straddles democracy and
autocracy.

In spite of these broadly voiced concerns, no one has yet attempted a

systematic evaluation of the spread of anti-democratic norms.
Democratic consolidation
By default, the democratic consolidation literature is related to democratic
decline. If a particular variable is needed in order for democratic consolidation to
happen, one can infer the absence of this would predicate democratic failure. And yet,
the distinctions between democratic failure and democratic consolidation are real as
noted by Linz and Stepan in their influential book on the problems of democratic
consolidation.
The democratic consolidation literature has several dominant theories. Of these,
the economic development strain is probably the most prominent. The main argument is
that a GDP of around $5,000 seems to guarantee democratic stability and insulate against

W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1960).
27
Witness the success of Fareed Zakaria's popular treatise on illiberal democracy The Future of Freedom:
Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003).
28
Vedi Hadiz, "The Rise of Neo-Third Worldism? The Indonesian Trajectory and the Consolidation of
Illiberal Democracy," Third World Quarterly 25, no. 1 (February 2004): 55-71; William Case, "Malaysia's

Resilient Psuedodemocracy," Journal of Democracy 12, no. 1 (January 2001): 43-57; Hussin Mutalib,
"Illiberal Democracy and the Future of Opposition in Singapore," Third World Quarterly 21, no. 2 (April
2000): 313-342.
29
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe,
South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 6.

11
on

reversal.

Barbara Geddes, in her assessment of democratization, asserted that only the

economic theory of democratic transition had garnered strong evidence.31
Another economically derived democratic transition theory links likelihood to
transition with resource endowment. These theorists argue that high resource
endowment, especially with oil and diamonds, tend to impact a society's receptivity to
democracy by creating anti-democratic incentives on the part of the elite.32
Institutions play a prominent role in another strand of the democratic
consolidation literature.33 Some scholars emphasize the type of political institution as
being important in democratic consolidation.34 Others emphasize the stability and
enforcement aspects of institutions, such as rule of law and the independence of the
judiciary.35 Still others emphasize the importance of civilian control of the military.36
Societal factors have also been considered. Some have investigated the claim that
certain cultures are simply unreceptive to democracy.37 Others argue that ethnic divisions
Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the
World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
31
Barbara Geddes, "What do we Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?" Annual Review of
Political Science 2 (June 1999): 115-144.
32
Benjamin Smith, "Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960-1999," American
Journal of Political Science 48, no. 2 (April 2004): 232-246; Michael Lewin Ross, "Does Oil Hinder
Democracy?" World Politics 53, no. 3 (April 2001): 325-361; Gwenn Okruhlik, "Rentier Wealth, Unruly
Law, and the Rise of the Opposition—The Political Economy of Oil States," Comparative Politics 31, no.
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certainly impact a society's ability to absorb democracy, as ethnic fragmentation leads to
problems with conflict resolution.38 Still other scholars have noted the importance of
shared values in the process of furthering political democratization.
There is even a smattering of articles that consider international factors. Some
argue that foreign aid is detrimental to democracy.

Colaresi and Thompson argue that a

number of international factors, such as external threat and trade openness, can aid or
hinder democratization.41 In addition, Mark Peceny found that American sponsorship of
elections during military interventions aided democratization, so a lack of external
involvement could also be inferred to be detrimental to developing democracies.42 Other
scholars have demonstrated the influence of outside information on the course of political
change.

This study lays the groundwork for examining the explanatory power and

limits of these various theoretical strands within the democratic consolidation literature.
The macro nature of this study will enable subsequent consideration of these competing
explanatory theories.
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Causal mechanisms of democratic failure
As has already been stated, some of the literature that has already been examined
infers a cause of democratic failure. For example, when Adam Przeworski and company
demonstrate the impact of GDP on democracy's sustainability, the inference is that
poverty causes of democratic failure.44 Many authors focus so exclusively on factors
leading to consolidated democracy that one must draw inferences regarding democratic
failure. There is also a considerable literature on the causes of democratic failure as
studied in their own right. As with the other literature examined, there tend to be
constellations. Myriad break-off theories of democratic failure exist, but this discussion
will be confined to the main constituents.
One constellation orbits around the role of political parties. A recent study has
found that the initial level of competition between political parties in new democracies is
crucial to its future. Low levels of initial political competitions are associated with
democratic failure.45 Others have focused on the level of competition between the
parties, locating an optimal level of competition with continued democratic governance,
while democratic failure is associated with very high and very low levels of political
competition.46 As evidenced by further studies, these scholars argue that political parties
are central to determining whether a democracy will fail or not.47
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A related constellation turns on the role of elites, a different category only
because elites may or may not be members of political parties. The extent to which elites
find it in their interest to either support or undermine democracy impacts its continuance
or demise.48 The attitudes of the elites greatly impact the stability of democracy.
The social fabric, particularly in regards to either homogeneity or heterogeneity,
has also been linked to democratic failure. It may seem so obvious that it's not worth
mentioning, but new democracies that are at war are predisposed to fail.49 A society's
presence as a British colony, particularly as a long-term British colony, is linked with
democratic survival.50 A more traditional social fabric argument is that democracy is not
sustainable in heterogeneous societies.51 Even the early democratic theorist John Stuart
Mill, thought democracy could not exist in heterogeneous societies.52
Economic concerns form another main constellation of literature. As has already
been discussed, poverty has been associated with democratic failure.53 Subsequent
studies have developed this idea in more nuanced directions. Some find the greatest
danger to democracy in states that combine a "basic needs" shortfall among the general
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population with increased economic development.

Others have linked a non-

diversified, resource endowed state with democratic failure.55
There is also a strand of literature looking at systemic concerns as they impact
democratic failure. Some of these emphasize the role of conflict in the international
system, others look at exogenous structural considerations, while others have focused
on the structure of the bureaucracy.58
It should be noted at the outset that while the cause of democratic failure is an
important subject, it will not be the focus of this work. Instead, this work will focus on
describing the incidence of democratic failure across time. Ultimately, the task of
applying the findings of this study to future analyses of the underlying causes of
democratic failure is left to others.
Democratic diffusion
The study of democratic failure also has much to gain from the literature
surrounding the study of democratic diffusion. The counterwaves, in particular, might be
conceived of as a sort of democratic diffusion in reverse. Simmons and Elkins have
presented seminal studies on the topic. 59 While acceptance of the idea of democratic
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diffusion is hardly universal, the literature surrounding the idea is broad enough to have
made several contributions to democratization theory.61 One might reasonably ask if
anti-democratization trends share links and similarities to democratic diffusion trends.

Undergirding Assumptions
Key concepts are fleshed out in this section, along with a brief description of the
methods used. In more common parlance these might be called the underlying
assumptions. Since the notion of underlying assumptions implies subliminal or
surreptitiously derived meanings, I treat these as undergirding assumptions, since they
form the structure upon which this project is built.
The first assumption is that democracy can be defined. Can democracy be
defined? Off the cuff, the answer is in the affirmative. Some states are democratic and
others are not. Regular election cycles, the peaceful transfer of power, and competitive
elections undergird the definition of democracy. To take it a step further, there are
distinctives of "liberal" democracy, such as an independent judiciary, a certain set of
guaranteed human rights for all citizens that cannot be voted away by the majority, lack
of military involvement in the political process, etc. Tomes have been filled with various
definitional considerations for democracy.

In the years since the felling of the World
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Trade Center, scholars and policy makers have struggled to define terrorism. As of this
writing, their efforts have failed to form an international consensus. When one looks at
the volumes filled with efforts to define democracy, the temptation is great to assume a
lack of agreement in definition here as well. This work will not attempt to add to this
philosophical debate, as worthy as that endeavor might be. Defining democracy is
certainly not as easy a task as it first might seem, but through solid scholarship core
accepted definitions have emerged.63 I do assert democracy is definable, even though
common parlance applies imprecise nuances to the word.
The second assumption is that democracy can be measured in ways that are
meaningful, if not complete. If scholars have long debated the definition of democracy,
the idea of somehow quantifying and measuring democracy has come in for even more
debate. As Seymour Lipset and Jason Lakin have said "key parts of democracy lie
outside the bounds of quantification."64 How does one measure and quantify a culture's
commitment to democracy? I well remember in the days following the tragedy of
September 11th, the terrorist assaults on the United States, being in a graduate seminar
with several international students. One of my colleagues had grown up in Ukraine,
largely under the Soviet Union's control. He immediately suggested that the United
States close down the borders and enforce curfews. He couldn't understand why his
American born colleagues looked at him with incredulity.
This example is purely anecdotal, but it illustrates some of the elusive
characteristics of democracy. These types of differences between cultures are difficult to
63

See, for example, Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Introduction: What Makes for
a Democracy?" in Politics in Developing Countries (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 1-66.
64
Seymour Martin Lipset and Jason Lakin, The Democratic Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma,
2004), 12.

18
quantify, although few would dispute their existence. While democracy's success in Asia
significantly undermines the cultural argument, neither can we entirely ignore
Tocqueville's "habits of the heart" argument, which infers that commitment to
democracy must be cultivated in a culture's ideals. Instead, I readily acknowledge that
all aspects of democracy can not be entirely quantified.
And yet, as a former skeptic of all quantitative approaches, I must admit the utility
of the more easily quantifiable aspects of democracy. Key to measuring democracy is the
ability to observe certain measurable components. Can one ascertain whether elections
are taking place? Yes. In spite of the fairly recent propensity of even grossly autocratic
rulers to use elections as a means for continuance of rule, one can observe and record
elections. One can determine the presence of regular elections and there are many
signposts to indicate whether they are open and competitive. One can look at the
constitutions and institutions that govern the actions of nations. One can point to whether
or not these documents and institutions actually are taken into account when decisions are
made or simply remain lofty ideals held apart from the gritty realities of political vice.
Coups are observable phenomena, as is military interference in the political process. One
can observe the repression of human rights and the lack of freedom of the press as well as
the reaction of the government to the opposition. One can observe whether the
opposition is jailed and persecuted or permitted to air their views.
These tangibles may not be sufficient in and of themselves for sustaining
democracy over time. However, these measurable components of democracy are crucial
in inculcating the habits of the heart. In fact, it is evident that these habits of the heart
and the cultural supporting mechanisms that give democratic rule sustenance are
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impossible without these initial measurable mechanisms. For the purposes of this study it
is enough to acknowledge the crucial interplay between the measurable and
unquantifiable components of democracy in its maintenance over time. This study will
focus on the nuts and bolts of democracy, knowing that these measurable components,
while not sufficient, are entirely necessary.
Fortunately, several databases now exist for measuring democracy.65 The
Freedom House index and the Polity IV database are the most widely used of these, with
the Polity IV exceeding Freedom House in scope of time. In addition the Polity IV
database has benefited from testing and improvements in transparency and through
systematic study of the database's weaknesses.66 Because of its longer duration, the
Polity database has served as the underlying measure of democracy and autocracy for this
study. The Polity database looks at institutionalized authority characteristics. Since I
view institutions as a reflection of the values held by a society, or at least by those in
power in a society, this helps bridge the gap between inherently measurable aspects of
democracy and the "habits of the heart" discussed earlier.
The third assumption is that both scaled and dichotomous measures of democracy
are useful. For the most part, I treat democracy as a scaled measure, as something that
can be present in increasing and decreasing concentrations. Why take a scaled approach?
Doesn't this run the risk of diluting democracy until it means nothing at all? It seems that
Juan Linz has this in mind when he exhorts:
65
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New adjectival democracies are labeled "pseudo", "semi", "illiberal,"
"electoral", or "delegative"—but these terms are in fact being used to
describe nondemocratic regimes (or in a few cases, low-quality democratic
governments).. .To avoid confusion, I propose the addition of adjectives to
"authoritarianism" rather than to "democracy": for example, electoral
authoritarianism, multiparty authoritarianism, center authoritarianism with
subnational democracy.67
While Linz is absolutely correct in the dangers of viewing democracy on a scale,
his approach fails to adequately take in the changes that have taken place within the
system. It is difficult to highlight these changes, which have been profound even when
the progression to coherent democracy has not been utter and complete, without referring
to these nation states using a scaled description of democracy. This project looks at
trends so it is particularly useful to categorize democracy as a scaled variable. Doing so
gives us leverage in comparing and contrasting and allows us to track changes in the
levels of democracy across time.
As has already been discussed, much study has gone into the measurement criteria
for democracy. The debate over measuring democracy as a dichotomous or scaled
variable has also benefited from scholarly discourse. In their article "Democracy and
Dichotomies: A Pragmatic Approach to Choices about Concepts," Collier and Adcock
argue that the use of democracy as a dichotomous variable or graded variable depends on
/TO

the goals of the research.

Elkins argues that on the whole graded measures have

superior validity and reliability.6 For the purposes of this study, a scaled approach is
used, except when issuing broad level comparisons between democracy and autocracy.
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The Polity IV database gives each nation state in the international system with a
population of one million or greater, a polity score for each year. This score is based on a
scale ranging from -10 to 10, with -10 being the most autocratic and 10 the most
democratic. This study divides democracy into 3 subgroups, based on their polity score.
On one end, we have high level democracy, with scores of 8 to 10. Next is mid-level
democracy, with scores of 5 to 7. The final category is low level democracy, with scores
of 1 to 4. Democracy is clearly present in the high level subset, which includes most
Western nations and an increasing number of non-Western nations as well. The midlevel democracy category includes those nations typically described in the literature as
consolidating. Low level democracies are sometimes not referred to as democracies at
all, but are often described as weak autocracies or liberalizing regimes. Democratic
failure is defined as a 3 point drop in polity score, which Polity has created as their
threshold for regime change.70
The fourth assumption is that a macro-level systematic analysis of democratic
failure is of value. Having dealt with the main definitional considerations, I will now
discuss the systematic nature of this study. Is this really the best approach? Would it not
instead be better to jump on the bandwagon of the burgeoning democratic consolidation
literature and attempt to problem solve using individual case studies? What is learned
from this method that can't be learned from case studies? Are there benefits to a "large
N" study or do the generalities that derive from such a study only mask the fact that all
cases of democratic regression are so individualized that studying them corporately is
futile?
70
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The fact that democracy's regression is clustered in certain time periods suggests
there may be systemic factors at work, exacerbating the domestic picture. While it is
beyond the scope of this work to definitively pinpoint all the systemic factors that
contribute to democratic failure, an in-depth description of the actual phenomenon should
serve to elucidate certain characteristics of the trend. This I shall do in Chapter III.
It is worthwhile to note that only through systematic study was the international
component of the forward progression of democracy described. As previously noted in
Samuel Huntington's Third Wave, the phenomenon of democracy's forward march across
time was broadly characterized to the general benefit of the field. In fact, this book
sparked an outpouring of literature on the progression of democracy. The big picture
characterization of democracy's forward waves allowed other questions to be asked, and
other hypotheses to be tested.
The fact that this service has not yet been performed for the counterwave
phenomenon is somewhat puzzling, but may be due to a preoccupation with democracy's
advance. While scholars have recognized the challenges faced by transitions to
democracy, as evidenced by the large extant literature on democratic transitions and
consolidation, the field has given little attention to the potential links in democratic
regression
This study, therefore, will largely approach things at the macro level,
supplementing with specific examples only in an illustrative manner. The compatibility
of the 2 approaches is fleshed out in Michael Coppedge's article "Thickening thin
concepts and theories—Combining large N and small in comparative politics."71 The
71
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author argues that small n studies benefit from the testing of large N studies, while
quantitative studies gain richness and depth from the case study approach.
Like an epidemiologist, this work will look at the epidemics, hitherto little
described, that strike democracies. The causes of democratic decline vary by location
and circumstance. Some democracies are aborted, some only wounded, some diseased
and others stunted. Their recovery is similarly distinct. Some democracies, like cats,
seem to have 9 lives. Others use their experience with decline as a sort of vaccination
experience, contracting a mild form of an illness while building immunity. This study
does not mean to imply that the individual patients are unimportant. It merely suggests
that challenges to democracy—whether experienced as complete failure, stagnation or
decline—are largely clustered together in time. Just as democracy goes forward in
waves, it retreats in waves as well.
Just as the study of epidemics in no way obviates the need for individual
physicians, this work doesn't obviate the need for case study analysis. Indeed, it draws
upon case study analysis. However, it does take a macro level approach that allows a big
picture view that facilitates a broader understanding of the threats to democracy. This is
an apt argument for macro studies.
This study attempts to untangle the big picture. Some might argue that there is no
big picture, but I disagree. The big picture is and has always been there, but in this age of
increasing globalization and information overload with increasing means of
communicating, the big picture is increasingly important. In order to put together
patterns, make sense of trends and prepare and equip nations for life in the international
system, the big picture is more important than ever.
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The fifth assumption is that history teaches important lessons. If the world is a
completely unpredictable place, wholly separated from historical context, if the past has
no bearing on the present, if we are doomed to always repeat the same policy mistakes
over and over again then there is no reason for scholarly debate. In the realm of
international study, academic endeavors are "graspings after the wind" in a world where
history doesn't matter. I argue this is not the case. History is important. At times history
demonstrates the ways we have changed, at other times the ways we have remained the
same. Regardless, it is impossible to fully understand the present without an
understanding of the past.

Conclusion
Understanding democratic regression is crucial to safeguarding democracy.
While the literature on democratization is burgeoning, few scholars are devoted to
studying the threats to democracy. Perhaps this is hardly surprising given the optimism
surrounding the spread of democracy. In the euphoria surrounding the end of the Cold
War, democracy's triumph took on the air of inevitability. Democracy had survived and
as the last man standing, seemed to point to itself as the ultimate political endpoint.
Francis Fukuyama's oft-quoted article trumpeted and celebrated this triumph of liberal
democracy as the end of history.72 In a more recent book, however, Fukuyama rushes to
qualify his thesis by arguing the triumph of liberal democracy was never automatic, and
is in need of safeguards to assure its continued progression.
72
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democratic gains seem increasingly tenuous, the time is ripe for a comprehensive
evaluation of democratic failure and the examination of that failure as it has functioned in
the international system. The time is right to provide a safeguard to democracy by filling
the gap in the literature with a comprehensive treatment of democratic failure in the
context of counterwaves. Fortunately, the existing literature has laid both the theoretical
and methodological groundwork that make this project possible.
This study also offers a venue to add to our understanding of the antidemocratic
movements which had such great historical impact. While fascism and communism,
along with the impacts of colonialism, have been discussed in great depth, they have yet
to be discussed in great width. This study offers just such an opportunity to investigate
the width of the historical incidence of anti-democratic political change.
Looking at democracy as a scaled variable offers important comparative
perspectives across the spectrum. I will examine highly organized forms of autocracy
and democracy, as well as looking at political systems with mixed autocratic and
democratic characteristics. Doing so gives us a better idea of the function of the
democratic ideal. It also offers points of comparison for nation states that swing back and
forth between democracy and autocracy. Through it all, I look at the way the
international system has evolved over time. In particular, I observe the ways it is both
different and the same since the adoption of democracy as the driving force behind ideal
and legitimate governance.
How will all of these things be accomplished? Before embarking on the meat of
the project, I will take a chapter to examine the oft-neglected foundations of democracy
and anti-democracy. I will look at this from the standpoint of political philosophy and
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historical chronology. With this knowledge firmly in hand, I'll examine the
counterwaves, the clusters of democratic failure. From there, I'll embark on an
examination of polities in order of decreasing democratic characteristics. I will first
consider high level democratic failure before turning to dissonant democracies, those
nation states with lower levels of democratic governance that have decidedly mixed
authority traits but still have discernible democratic characteristics. Finally, I'll look at
autocratic states, in particular at those states that have experienced the deepening of
autocracy. I'll then end the study where it began, with a discussion of the implications of
the findings, with a particular focus on tying together the remnants of antidemocratic
thought and its impact in the modern international system.
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CHAPTER II
FOUNDATIONS FOR ANTIDEMOCRACY

For philosophers and theologians alike, the problem of explaining the existence of
evil has been somewhat intractable. Is evil a force of its own, or is it simply the absence
of good? Is it defined as an independent entity, or only in relation to its twisting and
perversion of good? These questions of good and evil may, at first glance, seem to have
little place in a discourse about democratic failure, but I believe they inform our
discussion in important ways. The point is not to assert that democracy is good and
democratic failure is evil, but rather that democratic failure in and of itself is defined as a
lack of democracy. The reversion to some other form of governance is couched in terms
reserved for democracy.
Even speech patterns revolve around democracy in order to describe democratic
failure. In fact, Charles Tilly, in his book Democracy, could only refer to democratic
failure using terms like "undemocracy" and "de-democratization."' This is not simply a
matter for philologists, but gives important insight into how democratic failure is viewed
as a concept. It suggests that the various forms of autocracy are no more than the absence
of democracy.
I suggest that antidemocracy is a more apt term to describe the undercurrents in
democratic failure. I contend there are, and certainly always have been, forces aligned
against democracy, that by the same token form an ideational alternative to democracy.
This chapter traces these ideas through history, examines the main themes in
1
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antidemocracy in greater detail, then closes with an examination of the iterations of
antidemocratic ideals that continue to resonate today.

Antidemocracy through History
To frame the discussion of antidemocratic ideas, one must first look at the
possible constellations of power. Where does power reside? There are 3 basic
possibilities and myriad idiosyncratic manifestations. One person can be in charge, the
rule of one. A group of elite can be in charge, rule of the few. Or everyone that meets
certain requirements has a say in governance, rule of the many. All governments, historic
and present, can be loosely described as fitting into one of these 3 broad categories. The
purpose of this portion of the chapter is to journey back through history to examine the
ways each of these 3 different forms has been advocated at different points in history,
determining how democracy became the most venerated form of governance today. This
recap identifies undercurrents that are still present and highly relevant to the discussion
when government by "the many" lapses back into rule by one or the few.
The East
The East has never been accused of being naturally fertile ground for democracy.
This is not to say hints of democracy have been completely absent in the East, but
without doubt democracy first took root in the West. This becomes less surprising if one
examines some of the main constellations of thought prevalent in the East and their
predispositions toward democracy.
Indian philosophy winds back into pre-recorded history. The dominant religious
and cultural traditions of Hinduism and Buddhism both found their genesis in India.
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While these religious traditions are complex and distinct, they do share some similarities
that are important to this discussion. Both emphasize the importance of the self, which at
first glance might seem fertile ground for democracy since rule by the many presupposes
the importance of the individual. But, the focus turns to inward self improvement.
Above all else, Indian philosophy desires the liberation of self from fragmented
existence, through self-discipline and self-knowledge.2 Indian philosophy rests upon 2
further fundamental assumptions. It presupposes universal moral justice. The world
metes out to us only what we deserve. We bear the responsibility, and have determined
our own past and future. The other assumption is the unity of self and universe. Because
of this unity, the undivided whole, each individual has the ability to find this wholeness
through self-knowledge. Because self-knowledge is central, truth is relative.
It is impossible for one person to subscribe to one "true" philosophy and
to regard the others as completely false. Truth in philosophy depends
upon the human subject, and another's experience can be known only as
an object. There is no knowing the other as subject. Consequently, there
is no rejecting the other's experience as inadequate or unsatisfactory.3
The Indian philosophic concentration on self-discovery, its commitment to
relative truth, and its presupposition of universal moral justice did not give rise to a
robust tradition of political philosophy. The presupposition of universal moral justice, in
particular, reinforced societal suffering as deserved, while also reinforcing the notion that
the requisite tools for escaping that suffering were already available to each person within
himself. Given these philosophical presuppositions, it is not surprising democracy was
birthed outside India's borders. And yet, democracy has managed to survive there in
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modern times, in spite of the cultural foundation that would seem to oppose it, urging
caution to those who would argue democracy can only be sustained where it was birthed.
Much blame for Asian distaste for democracy has also been laid at the feet of
Confucius, born around 551 B.C. Unlike his Indian counterparts, Confucian philosophy
was essentially political in nature. Living in a tumultuous time, he founded a political
philosophy that permeated every aspect of social relationships. Centralized leadership, in
the form of an emperor, was crucial to his idealized society, as were correct social
boundaries and loyalties. The ruler was to be emulated as he modeled correct adherence
to virtue, while social relationships were governed by the key virtues of filial piety,
loyalty, and manners.4 While much wisdom can be garnered from The Analects,
democracy, with its focus on individual rights, is not one of them. Still, at various points
of time in imperial China, the governing system which rested on Confucian ideals
supported a meritocracy in which the best and brightest experienced significant social
mobility while providing a system of some restraint against highly centralized imperial
rule.
The West
We've established some antidemocratic leanings in the main thoughts of Eastern
philosophy, now we turn to Western philosophy to see if the case is any different.
Interestingly, echoes of Confucian philosophy can be found in the writings of Plato.
Written around 360 B.C., Plato's Republic puts forth the rule of a philosopher king,
supported by an elite class of educated philosophers, who would rule by example,
training and educating the masses in the ways of virtue. His idealized society
4
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emphasized education as a key to advancing the mind and taming the spirit.5 The king
would be the idealized form of all these important attributes. Plato never even hints that
democracy is an acceptable form of government. Like Confucius, his ideal governance
centers on a good ruler as the key to a stable Utopian society.
Thucydides, a contemporary of Plato, offers a slightly different perspective on the
value of democracy. Athens, often cited as a democracy, elected their generals and city
treasurers, showing the tangible difference between the East and the West in terms of the
practice of democracy.6 Defying predictions to the contrary, the Athenian democracy
lasted for 150 years, with only a couple brief interludes of oligarchic rule. While
Thucydides wasn't glowing in his review of democratic rule, he includes Athenogoras'
defense of democracy, in response to the charge that democracy was neither wise nor
equitable:
I say, on the contrary, first that the word demos, or people, includes the
whole state, oligarchy only a part; next that if the best guardians of
property are the rich, and the best counselors the wise, none can hear and
decide so well as the many; and that all these talents individually and
collectively, have their just place in a democracy. But an oligarchy gives
the many their share of the danger, and not content with the largest part
takes and keeps the whole of the profit.7
Thus, even in a form of democracy that today would be treated as quite limited,
democracy was viewed by some as the most equitable form of governance. In fact, it is
reasonable to assert that the brevity of the 2 oligarchic disruptions in democratic rule
5
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indicates the democratic form of governance was important to the general public,
otherwise it would not have been reinstated and defended.
Aristotle, in his Politics, made the contribution of advocating a mixed form of
governance. While Aristotle, like Plato, emphasized the virtues of the rulers, he stressed
the constitution as the key to limiting the power of rulers. 8 He saw the importance of
creating a convergence of norms and ideas of governance. If everyone buys into the
constitution, a system of constraint is in place so that the type of governance is
unimportant. This seemingly even-handed approach to regime type belies Aristotle's
underlying prejudice against democracies. He notes that "while it is possible for one or a
few to be outstandingly virtuous, it is difficult for a larger number to be accomplished in
every virtue."9 Perhaps more in accord with his teacher Plato than he would like to
admit, throughout the book he hints at the relative practical ease of kingship and the
relative difficulties inherent in mass representation. At best, he gives the "rule by the
many" a place alongside other legitimate forms of government as long as it doesn't
descend into a deviant form. While he advocates working toward the common good, he
indicates the achievement of this ideal will more likely occur in rule by the one or the
few.
From the ancient Greece we leapfrog through history to reach Machiavelli in a
fragmented Italy that still resembles the city state mentality of the Greek period we've
just been discussing. In his well-known essay The Prince, again the admiration for strong
a centralized authority figure emerges. While his essays in The Discourses offer a defense
of democracy that contrasts to his better known piece, Machiavelli's practical advice to
8
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the ruler of his day in The Prince at least demonstrates the continuing reliance on
centralized rule by the one or the few as the most practical political arrangement, while
the arguments of The Discourses demonstrate some of democracy's desirable
components.
From Machiavelli, we fast forward again through the dominance of monarchy and
city states to a time in Western history when legislatures were finally in ascendance and
change was in the air. In this grouping, the works of some of the Enlightenment political
philosophers will be considered. Particular attention will focus on the issue of ideal
governance, in a time when shifts away from traditional monarchy marked a break from
the past.
Thomas Hobbes published Leviathan in 1651, raising his overarching concern for
protection from anarchy. He emphasized the importance of stability and sacrificed
freedom. But it is his role as an advocate of the absolute necessity of a centralized power
that remains the distinguishing characteristic of his book.10 The central power's actions
are unpunishable. He is both the maker and enforcer of laws, and the maker of both war
and peace. n Hobbes blames the division of these sovereign rights (into powers for the
King, powers for the Lords, and powers for the House of Commons) for the Civil War
that was taking place in Britain at the time of the writing of his book.

It is not

surprising that the thoughts found here. The ultimate value placed on a stable society
1 "3

echoes the works of Roman writers who also wrote during times of civil war.
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premium placed on security, when security is absent, certainly has informed regime type
choices, and remains relevant today, finding echoes in the "garrison state" literature
mentioned in the previous chapter.
Writing a rough 100 years after Hobbes, Rousseau published The Social Contract
in 1762. His critique of monarchy, especially the argument that a monarchy was best
suited to preserving stability at all costs, was quite direct...even cheeky:
Life is also tranquil in dungeons; is that enough to feel well in them? The
Greeks imprisoned in the Cyclops' cave lived there tranquilly while
awaiting their turn to be devoured. 4
Departing from guarantees of societal stability that were rooted in centralized authority,
or in a virtuous king, Rousseau's main proposal took a modified community utilitarian
approach. This approach answered the puzzle of finding "a form of association that will
defend and protect the persona and goods of each associate with the full common
force."15 This compact, which he dubbed the "social contract," solved the problem he
saw with man's natural tendency to look only to his own self-preservation and the impact
this had on society in general. In describing this philosophy Rousseau envisioned that
"each of us puts his person and his full power in common under the supreme direction of
the general will; and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the
whole."16
While concern for equality was central, enforcement of the contract hardly required
the direction of the many. As the author himself acknowledged, it depended on a
dictatorial community that did whatever it took to enforce the contract:
14
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Hence, for the social compact not to be an empty formula, it tacitly
includes the following engagement which alone can give force to the rest,
that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so
by the entire body; which means nothing other than that he shall be forced
to be free....17
So, we can see that Rousseau introduced this idea of a centralized authority that would
enforce the will of the majority. This paternalism, while a step away from Hobbes more
starkly conceived central authority, is by no means a friend to liberal democracy.
Perhaps it is all the more dangerous for being insidious.
Of course, there were other writers during this time period that made significant
contributions to liberal democracy's advance. John Locke, added formulations of the rule
1 R

of law in his Treatise. Immanuel Kant for the first time linked regime type to propensity
for conflict, suggesting an international system populated with republics would be key to
peace.19 John Stuart Mill pointed out the dangers of Rousseau's Social Contract by
delineating the tyranny of the majority.

These works were important in countering the

antidemocratic currents of the Enlightenment.
In direct counterpoint to the ideal of democracy as the future of pure governance
was the ideal of communism. Occupying scarcely more than forty pages of typewritten
text, The Communist Manifesto makes up for in substance what it lacks in duration. The
spark for a movement that changed the direction of history and impacted the lives of
millions, this slender volume deserves careful consideration.
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With its famous opening line to Chapter One, this essay promptly divides the
world into 2 groups, the oppressor and the oppressed.21 The essay traced the impact of
the Industrial Revolution, and the free trade movement as harbingers of a new class they
called the industrial proletariat consisting of workers that were being exploited by the
resource-rich bourgeoisie. Some elements of the modern anti-globalization movement
find roots here as Marx and Engels lament the dependency that the spread of commerce
has induced in foreign lands throughout the world.22
The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of
production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws
all, even the most barbarian nations into civilization. The cheap prices of
its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all
Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate
hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of
extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to
introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to become
bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own
23

image.
At its most basic level, the manifesto deals with the fundamentals of human
purpose and existence, these being the struggles to live with technology, to find meaning
in life, and to deal with change.
Owing to the extensive use of machinery and to division of labour, the
work of the proletarians has lost all individual character, and,
consequently, all charm for the workman. He becomes an appendage of
the machine, and it is only the most simple, most monotonous, and most
easily acquired knack, that is required of him. Hence, the cost of
production of a workman is restricted, almost entirely, to the means of
subsistence that he requires for his maintenance, and for the propagation
of his race.24
In the conditions of the proletariat, those of old society at large are already
virtually swamped. The proletarian is without property; his relation to his
wife and children has no longer anything in common with the bourgeois
family relations; modern industrial labour, modern subjugation to capital,
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the same in England as in France, in America as in Germany, has stripped
him of every trace of national character. Law, morality, religion, are to
him so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as
many bourgeois interests.25
The Communist movement searched for significance in the midst of a world that
seemed threatening. It offered the hope of change for the better to those left behind in the
shuffle of "progress." It resonated with the target audience of the disenfranchised, even
when they didn't fit the label "modern industrial labor." The Communist movement
remains an example of the power of an idea to motivate diverse unhappy people
worldwide to participate in, or submit themselves to, revolution. At its peak it faced
democracy with a grave threat, seizing upon the ideas of equality and a type of social
contract for the betterment of the majority. The political systems that emerged promised
basic levels of goods to all. In return, the central State took a great deal of authority and
left little individual autonomy. Communism, in short, combined several of the ideals of
Hobbes' leviathan state and coupled them with Rousseau's ideas of working for the good
of the majority. It was the culmination of a fusion of ideals.
The threads of this discussion hint at the inherent weaknesses long dead political
pundits saw in democracy. Some of these can be explained away simply because the
word democracy means something different in common usage today than it did in
previous eras. Still, the idea that "the masses" would be involved in governance has
brought up interesting, and sometimes enlightened, discussions on the frailties of
democracy. In this treatment of democratic failure, the examination of these critiques is
well-served. It addresses the fundamental concept of how much the international
25
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community of today is different than that of the past, and the ways it is the same. From
this topic we will now turn to recurring themes in antidemocracy.

Themes in Antidemocracy
This section will explore various themes in antidemocracy. These themes
undermine the democratic ideal and form an important base for the discussion of
democratic failure in the time period under consideration.
Mass rule equals instability
What does it mean to say "the people have spoken?" This phrase could rightly be
uttered at the conclusion of a lynching or at the announcement of the winner of a wellordered election, although the circumstances surrounding the 2 differ dramatically. And
yet, both cases reflect the will of the many. Mob rule is hardly considered an appropriate
expression of democracy today, and yet mobs on violent binges consistently appear in
historic criticisms of democracy.
Even Cicero, often described as one of the most eloquent defenders of electoral
contests,26 speaks of democracy as a type of mob rule with "cruel and violent potential"
although with benefits if managed by a good leader.27 This mercurial aspect of mass rule
has been decried across the centuries as an undesirable side effect of democratic rule.
Given this, chronic instability should surface as a major failing of unrestricted mass rule.
Cicero thus advocated a public united in a genuine "partnership founded on law,"
otherwise mass participation devolves into a "despotism exercised by the mob."
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When this rule of law is absent, mob rule indeed becomes violent. This is true in
the Roman Empire as well as in ancient Greece. What has been referred to as "direct
democracy," where mass assemblies were in control, can only be described as volatile
and violent. Polybius, a Greek statesman, described the strength of the Roman
constitution as being mixed, in the best Aristotelian sense. Comprised of checks and
balances, it was able to stave off the undesirable side effects of the simple forms of rule
by one, rule by the few, and rule by the many. As John Dickenson notes:
According to Polybius, each of these forms was represented, respectively,
by the consuls, the senate, and the assemblies; but through the reciprocal
checks and balances which existed among the organs representing the
principles of these different forms of government, the mixed form,
operating in mutual interdependency of all three, exhibited special strength
by maintaining an appropriate equilibrium among them.29
When the system of checks and balances degenerated, the atmosphere within the Roman
Empire changed, reverting back to mob rule which in turn paved the way for
"irresponsible demagoguery as a normal feature of political activity."

Within the space

of 40 years, Roman politics featured decreased senatorial influence and power, chronic
"3 1

election riots and prevalent bloodshed.
While Aristotle was not fond of democracy in his writings, we can perhaps
attribute a portion of this to the way democracy was conceived in his time. In ancient
times the word was associated with the immediate action of the mob, who might then
regret their decisions, while democracy today is associated with measured action. Today
the whole judicial process in liberal democracies is associated with slowness, not
immediate justice. Aristotle's advocacy of a mixed constitution contemplated the idea
29
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for a system of checks and balances, which could temper the very dangers of instability
he feared in the democracy of his time.
Machiavelli echoes Aristotle's concerns, adding his voice to those fearing
instability in democracy saying "Thus monarchies easily become tyrannies, aristocracies
become oligarchies and democracies slide into anarchy."32 It is important to notice that
although both tyranny and oligarchy are on Aristotle's list of bad outcomes for a nation,
the dissolution of democracy plunges a city state into "ungovernment" while the other
transformations from "good" rule to "bad" rule are still functional governments...even if
considered evil. This peculiarity of democracy suggests a similarly peculiar logic. When
the people no longer attend to the government, there is no alternative other than anarchy.
With monarchy, when the government degenerates, it simply collapses in and shows its
might. With aristocracies, they centralize and rule by force as well, but for a democracy
the dissolution leaves no structure behind, since "we the people" have abandoned the
structure of government and nothing remains with which to construct even an
authoritarian government. After all, it is impossible for "we the people" to tyrannize
themselves. Thus, instability reigns chief. While Aristotle's definition of democracy
differed somewhat substantially from that of today, the critique of democracy as a
destroyer of stability is still touted today as democracies are seen as particularly unstable
and prone to disintegration.
While recognizing these frequent critiques of democracy, De Tocqueville
observed none of them in the newly made United States. As has already been noted, a
32
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critique of democracy that consistently surfaces is the lack of stability for this particular
type of governance, but de Tocqueville notes a change that has occurred with the leap of
democracy from city state to nation state:
I hear it said that it is in the nature and the habits of democracies to be
constantly changing their opinions and feelings. This may be true of small
democratic nations, like those of the ancient world, in which the whole
community could be assembled in a public place and then excited at will
by an orator. But I saw nothing of the kind among the great democratic
people that dwells on the opposite shores of the Atlantic Ocean.34
The democracy of nation states, almost invariably larger than the city states where direct
democracy was more plausible, depended upon institutions. These institutions seemed to
tame direct democracy's dark side, creating a system of checks and balances within rule
by the many that represented a deviation from past forms of democracy.
A utocracy 's lingering power
Machiavelli described another aspect of the instability of new democracies as
centered in the nature of the people long accustomed to an autocratic regime and their
inability to adjust their faculties to democracy and greater freedom.
There are numerous examples to be found in ancient history that show
how difficult it is for a people who are accustomed to being ruled by one
man to preserve their liberty if by some chance they acquire it, as Rome
acquired its liberty when it threw out the Tarquins. This is as you would
expect, for such a people are no different from a wild beast which,
although by nature savage and untamed, has been raised from birth in a
prison and in slavery. If it is then allowed to wander freely in the
countryside, because it has no experience of hunting for its food and no
knowledge of where to take refuge, it will be recaptured by the first person
who sets out to hunt it down. The same thing happens with a people.
Being used to living at the commande of others, having no experience of
debating questions of strategy, whether of defense or offense, having no
knowledge of their neighboring rulers, and being unknown to them, they
quickly succumb once again to a ruler's yoke and usually end up under a
harsher tyranny than the one from which they have just escaped....In
addition, there is another problem, which is that a state that becomes free
acquired bitter enemies, but not loyal allies. All those who benefited
under the previous tyranny, who fed off the wealth of the ruler, become
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Henry Reeve, ed. Phillips Bradley, vol. 2 (New
York: Vintage Classics, 1990), 257.
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bitter enemies. They have lost the opportunity to become rich, and so
cannot live content. Each one of them is forced to try to reconstruct the
old tyranny in order to recover his old influence.35
Machiavelli deals with several themes that certainly still resonate today. He
asserts that highly centralized rule, even once it has been defeated, leaves a residue
staining the people whose minds have been sheltered from the necessities of daily rule.
He accuses the people of ignorance, and the inability to break out of the shackles of their
minds. In short, "the many" don't know the ropes and so they hang themselves. In
addition, Machiavelli addresses the problem of the disenfranchised elite, who
automatically become enemies of the new regime, an idea with resonance today.36 The
failure to offer adequate options, even "buy outs," to former regime officials is still
positively associated with democratic failure.
Democracy is too Utopian
"If there were a people of Gods, they would govern themselves democratically.
So perfect a Government is not suited to men."37 With this statement, Rousseau
condemns democracy as unfettered idealism. But was he really talking about democracy
as known today, or was he using the word to mean something completely different?
Clues are given by the context surrounding the statement. Jean-Jacques Rousseau's
definition of democracy is a different animal than that as later conceived in the American,
and even the French, Revolution. The "new" democracy involved certain intrinsic rights,
something Rousseau rejected. Today, the democratic ideal includes guarantees of
35
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individual freedoms, not unlike those guarantees involved in the Bill of Rights, and
reacting against the "tyranny of the majority" mentality. Rousseau, in contrast, had
called for a tyranny of the majority as the true reflection of the best way forward. This is
another good example of the caution we need to show in assuming words have had the
same meaning across time. The same words are oftentimes used, but with very different
meanings and contexts. Caution is in order.
In today's common parlance, democracy is not only a type of government, it is
also a hypothetical ideal. Perfect participation, the perfect expression of all segments of
the population eligible to participate in politics, occurs only in the realm of the ideal.
Utopian democracy is indeed a dream, but democratic governance does exist. In this
world of imperfect and flawed people, democracy fairly reflects the qualities of its
constituents. Democracy is largely about the exercise of restraint. The beast may paw at
the ground, but the people serve as both bridle and bit that direct the leviathan.
And yet Rousseau dismissed democracy as an inherently unrealistic form of
governance saying:
In the strict sense of the term, a genuine Democracy never has existed, and
never will exist. It is against the natural order that the greater number
govern and the smaller number be governed. It is unimaginable that the
people remain constantly assembled to attend to public affairs, and it is
readily evident that it could not establish commissions to do so without the
TO

form of the administration changing.
Clearly, Rousseau could not foresee any arrangement of democratic institutions that
could convert democracy from Utopian ideal to tangible governance. The fact that these
institutions did evolve freed democracy from these antidemocratic entanglements. In
modern times, however, the criticism of democracy as too Utopian still surfaces,
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particularly when speaking of countries that do not have well-developed institutions to
both tame democracy and ensure forward progress beyond legislative gridlock.
There are other weaker variants of the idea of democracy as Utopian. Even Alexis
de Tocqueville thought democracy had only arisen in American because of the lack of
external threats. He argues that democracy was able to flourish in America because it
was "a nation without neighbors."40 He saw external threats as an impetus for the
increase of the executive government, since foreign affairs remains the one arena where
democracy cannot penetrate.41 One can infer from Tocqueville's argument that in the
continental context of Europe, democracy would be harder to implement. This expands a
bit on Machiavelli's discussion of a similar point, that when a power is brought down the
alliance structure necessary for state survival is difficult to implement since all those in
the system have a vested interest in the prior status quo.42 These arguments demonstrate
the perceived difficulties of being a democracy in an international system that didn't
respect that type of governance.
The dangers of democracy's rhetoric
Jean-Jacques Rousseau was also very concerned with the perversion of
democracy. In particular, he distrusted clever politicians who could sway the people with
smooth rhetoric. He saw that public deliberations could bring with them the danger of
convincing the people to do something that was actually not in their interest:
39
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It does not follow, however, that public deliberations are always equitable;
they may not be so regarding foreign affairs; I have stated the reason why
this is so. Thus it is not impossible that a well-governed republic might
wage an unjust war. Nor it is impossible that the council of democracy
pass bad decrees or condemn the innocent: but none of this will ever
happen unless the people is seduced by private interests which some few
skillful men succeed by their reputation and eloquence to substitute for the
people's own interest. Then the public deliberation will be one thing, and
the general will another thing entirely. Do not, therefore, raise the
democracy of Athens as an objection to me, because Athens was in fact
not a democracy, but a most tyrannical aristocracy governed by learned
men and orators. Attend carefully to what happens in any deliberation,
and you will see that the general will is always for the common good; but
very often some secret division develops, some tacit alliance which causes
the assembly's natural disposition to be eluded in favor of private views.
Then the social body really divides into other bodies whose members
adopt a general will, good and just with regard to these new bodies, unjust
and bad with regard to the whole form which each of them dismembers
Rousseau was concerned about the way minds can be swayed away from what is for the
general good. The general will is always for the common good, but if something is
passed that is not for the common good then it is not the general will. This would seem a
rather circular argument. At any rate, the solution to such a problem is clear, as has
already been discussed earlier in the chapter. The "social contract" will have to be
enforced by a central authority with power over all to enforce the common good. Here,
Rousseau's foundation is paternalism. It rests on the assumption that the people may in
fact be deluded into acting against their interest. In a well-ordered democracy, however,
even if this should occur the people have opportunities to redress the situation. The
danger of Rousseau's argument, the antidemocratic quality, is toxic as it easily leads to a
centralized power structure to "enforce the common good." Upon this paternalistic
foundation many an autocratic state has been formed.
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Perhaps this was m Tocqueville's mind when he expressed a fear that democracy
would lead to tyranny by way of paternalism:
I have not fear that they will meet with tyrants in their rulers, but rather
with guardians...The will of man is not shattered, but softened, bent and
guided; men are seldom forced by it to act, but they are constantly
restrained from acting. Such a power does not destroy, but it prevents
existence; it does not tyrannize, but it compresses, enervates, extinguishes
and stupefies a people, till each nation is reduced to nothing better than a
flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the
shepherd...Our contemporaries are constantly excited by two conflicting
passions: they want to be led and they wish to remain free.44
He goes on to explain why he feels democratic governance is particularly
vulnerable to this sort of absolute despotism, in ways that echo Machiavelli's concerns:
I believe that it is easier to establish an absolute and despotic government
among a people in which the conditions of society are equal than among
any other; and I think that if such a government were once established
among such a people, it not only would oppress men, but would eventually
strip each of them of several of the highest qualities of humanity.
Despotism, therefore, appears to me peculiarly to be dreaded in
democratic times. I should have loved freedom, I believe, at all times, but
in the time in which we live I am ready to worship it.
Tocqueville's concerns projected into the twentieth century, when democracy did indeed
face dire threats to freedom, the subject of the next section.

The New Challenges of Modern Antidemocracy
The beginning of the Great War brought into sharp focus the new challenges of
the modern age for democracy. The nineteenth century had been one of great change,
with technological advance introducing mechanization and the need for resources in an
unprecedented fashion. It was a world dominated by Europe, having been in large
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measure carved and split between the various European nation states. Winston Churchill
describes that European world on the eve of WWI with great nostalgia and fondness:
Like many others, I often summon up in my memory the impression of
those July [1914] days. The world on the very eve of its catastrophe was
very brilliant. Nations and Empires crowned with princes and potentates
rose majestically on every side, lapped in the accumulated treasures of the
long peace. All were fitted and fastened—it seemed securely—into an
immense cantilever. The two mighty European systems faced each other
glittering and clanking in their panoply, but with a tranquil gaze. A polite,
discreet, pacific, and on the whole sincere diplomacy spread its web of
connections over both. A sentence in a dispatch, an observation by an
ambassador, a cryptic phrase in a Parliament seemed sufficient to adjust
from day to day the balance of the prodigious structure. Words counted,
and even whispers. A nod could be made to tell. Were we after all to
achieve world security and universal peace by a marvelous system of
combinations in equipoise and of armaments in equation, of checks and
counterchecks on violent action ever more complex and delicate? Would
Europe thus marshaled, thus grouped, thus related, unite into one universal
and glorious organism capable of receiving and enjoying in undreamed of
abundance the bounty which nature and science stood hand in hand to
give? The old world in its sunset was fair to see.46
But if the world of 1914 brings a nostalgic half-smile to mind, the realities of the post war
era sober even the most committed optimist. The world has always known divides.
Language, culture, religion, and distance have divided humanity for long centuries. With
the onset of modernity, some of these divides have been lessened but in their wake others
have arisen. Antidemocratic ideals divided the world after World War I in ways that
were previously impossible. The divides of liberal democracy and fascism, along with
liberal democracy and communism were ignited by the horrors of this great conflict.
The word fascism is derived from the Italian word describing the symbol of
ancient Roman government, tightly bound sticks with an axe in the center.47 Mussolini's
vision of a highly centralized government derived from his desire for a strong state that
46
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could never be broken. Fascism, unlike communism, has no overt shared ideology. It is
difficult to determine with precision the differences between a fascist and a highly
autocratic regime. This distinction is unnecessary. While autocratic regimes today are
not deemed fascist, perhaps because of the connotation linked with World War II, for all
intents and purposes any nation committed to the antidemocratic principles of highly
centralized power structures with no accountability to the many, shares the essential
qualities of Mussolini's Italy. They are indeed tightly bound.
Communism, its ideas first presented in the aforementioned Communist
Manifesto, was able to wed the nation state because of the Great War. While this
ultimately ended in a great divorce, the world is a vastly different place today because of
the marriage. After World War II, with the onset of the Cold War, the more
institutionalized communism of the USSR courted foreign dignitaries and rabble rousers,
educating them in the art of revolution and state craft.

Communism derived its

legitimacy from the ideology of absolute equality. Practically speaking, however, this
equality had to be enforced by a central authority, "a la Rousseau," that was supposed to
act in the best interest of the people. Hitchhiking from the German example of
totalitarian rule, the Soviets married ideology with a totalitarian regime that was
inherently antidemocratic in nature.
Somewhat ironically liberal democracy in general, and the United States in
particular as the most powerful liberal democracy post-1945, reacted to this threat by
quashing fledgling democracies and supporting autocrats that were friendly to Western
48
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interests.

Confirming the earlier critique of democracy as inherently instable, the U.S.

feared the advance of Communism in these fledgling democracies and preferred stability
at all costs.
If globalized conflict impacted the conflict of liberal democracy versus fascism
and communism, it also introduced a new divide between nation states and those lacking
a national identity. In the decolonization era that followed World War II, former colonies
now faced the task of cobbling together governance over a national territory whose
boundaries had often been drawn by outsiders. As seen in the post-colonial legacy, a lack
of identity can have lasting ramifications. In commenting on the loss of identity Neville
Brown says:
Loss of identity may by then have been more a fount of radicalism than
penury per se. Those trapped in grinding poverty are usually more
concerned to break out than to save humankind at large. The world of the
near future may likewise contain more people who have been radicalized
by identity crisis than is currently anticipated either by governments or by
the literati. The signs are very evident in a swathe of territory extending
through the Horn of Africa, Arabia and the Gulf to Central Asia.5
While the radicalization of those in identity crisis as a threat to global security is one
aspect of this new challenge, another is that experienced internally with chronic
instability. Whether by frequent coups or by civil war, many of Europe's post-colonial
holding still harbor antidemocratic legacies.
Even when valuable resources are discovered in countries with antidemocratic
currents, transitions to stable democratic rule are often problematic. New resources, such
49
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as oil, have seemed to stack the deck against democracy. A dominant rationale is that
nations wealthy in resources such as oil have no need for parliaments because they "win
popular acquiescence through distribution rather than support through taxation and
representation."
Fueled in part by the nation states made wealthy by resource endowment, the
transition to market economies has not led to strong democracies, leaving a weaker than
anticipated link between strong economies leading to strong democracies. As Michael
Dauderstadt has noted, while the democratization process has stalled out in many
transition countries, some of the greatest economic successes have been generated from
authoritarian rule.
Adding to this is the continuing divide between the "haves" and the "have nots".
While this divide is not new in origin, the awareness of the divide is more prevalent today
than ever before, imbuing a seething resentment. The intersect of the post-colonial
residue and the increase in state power as located in nation states has resulted in a
discernible "north-south" divide. As noted by Gurr et al:
The successful political systems of the northern hemisphere have matured
into two increasingly distinct and internally consistent types: coherent
multiparty democracies and one-party autocracies. The political patterns
of Latin America and the postcolonial Third and Fourth worlds are far
more heterogeneous. Their histories of experimentation with democracy,
autocracy, and mixed regimes are fraught with instability and few show
evidence of sustained linear progression toward one or another of the
increasingly pure types that prevail in the northern hemisphere.54
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But the story is not rosy for democracy in these northern hemisphere countries
either. When Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam published the original version of
Disaffected Democracies, the world seemed cold toward democracy. The Soviet Union
was becoming more assertive, Nixon had been forced to resign, and Europe was divided,
with the Western half at times seeming to cower in the shadow of its Soviet neighbors.55
In the midst of this uncertainty perhaps it is not surprising that Pharr and Putnam's study
found broad disillusionment with democracy among the high level democracies. The
results of their updated study in the 1990s, a time of euphoria and optimism concerning
democracy and its spread, are more troubling. Even with the triumph of democracy over
communism 25 years later "the low confidence in government in America and other
Trilateral countries has not only continued but deepened."56 What this portends, I won't
predict, other than to say this further highlights the need to study and understand
antidemocracy in the context of history more fully.

Conclusion
Dominant today as the most popular form of legitimacy, rule by the many argues
that government exists at the people's mandate. As this discussion has demonstrated, that
view has been a minority one across the span of history. Long held in poor esteem,
democracy was traditionally viewed as little more than mob rule. Decried as inherently
unstable, Utopian, and prone to dangerous rhetoric, democracy has only recently become
the government of choice. Autocracy, however, was seen as so powerful that even if a
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nation escapes its clutches the people remain damaged by their autocratic experience,
thus predisposing them to an even more extreme subsequent autocracy.
While innovations in democratic institutions, coupled with advances in
technology and bureaucracy, have enabled democracy's escape from many of the historic
critiques, it faced new challenges in the 20th century. Global conflict created great
ideological divides between governments centered on liberty, governments centered on
stability, and governments centered on equality. These various governments derived
their legitimacy from varying locations. Governments centered on stability derived
legitimacy either as a birthright, or from the idea that strong central governance is in the
best interest of all since it serves as the key to preserving order. Governments centered
on equality drew on ideological substantiation for their legitimacy, while claiming to rule
in a way that reflected the will of the people as their guardians. Governments centered on
liberty continued their legitimacy by reflecting the will of the people as mandated by the
people.
Stability, equality and liberty are all popular values, but at various times in history
stability and equality have excluded liberty as the weaker and less necessary partner. The
way governments have reflected antidemocratic undercurrents across time is the subject
of this study. The exploration continues by looking at those times when those
undercurrents took control. The next chapter examines the counterwaves.
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CHAPTER III
THE COUNTERWAVES

"But always the Dark was there, swelling and waning.. .."1
If democracy is light and antidemocracy dark, then the counterwaves are the times
when "the dark is rising." Clustered in time, the counterwaves are pockets of strong
antidemocratic sentiment. As demonstrated by the previous chapter this undertow, until
more recent history, was the dominant force in governance and world politics. Only in
the last 200 years has liberal democracy overcome this pull and only in the past few
decades could liberal democracy be rightly described as the dominant source of
legitimacy for nation states in the world system. In some sense, then, one might describe
the counterwaves as inherently conservative movements, a harkening back to the ways of
a previous order.
Antidemocracy, however, has evolved in ways that defy this simple description.
As modernity drew the entire planet into her orbit, the use of power to govern changed in
meaningful ways as well. This is true for both liberal democracy and autocracy. The
counterwaves, the first occurring from 1922-1940 and the second from 1957-1977,
occupy interesting time bands of history. Our first task, then, is to situate the
counterwaves properly in their historical context, before examining them in general and
comparative terms.
1
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Important Historical Context
Change occurs on a daily basis, but big events seem to infuse the system with
energy, and force spurts of intensive change. While the norm is a gradual and
manageable tension, at times there are earthquakes and eruptions. Shifts in the status quo
take place and rapid changes in the landscape result. The twentieth century saw
tremendous and intense times of sudden shifts. To give context to the era of the
counterwaves, one needs to touch on 4 macro processes, roughly chronological in nature,
that have shaped democratic failure, particularly as it relates to the counterwaves. These
processes are: nationalism, colonialism, globalized conflict and de-colonization.
The relative stasis of the 1800s belied the important processes at work. At the
dawn of the 19th century, feudal institutions were weakening, and with them the
personalistic allegiance structures. In place of these structures, more centralized state
systems emerged empowering legislatures, entities that in turn defined law and society in
new and malleable ways. This represented a tremendous break from the past. As J.M.
Roberts wrote:
To a medieval European the idea that there might not be rights and rules
above human interference, legal immunities and chartered freedoms
inaccessible to change by subsequent law-makers, fundamental laws
which would always be respected or laws of God which could never be
contravened by those of men, would have been social and juridical, as well
as theological, blasphemy.3
One should not lose sight of the fact that a rise in democratic power represented a shift
away from previous well-ordered social structures. The secularization of culture, the
sense that history was progressing toward an apex, and the veneration of scientific
knowledge as the key to limitless progress were all legacies of the Enlightenment, the
3
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birth place of liberalism.4 The American and French Revolutions set the stage for
sweeping change, as "belief in Man, individual Man, his Nature, his Reason, his Rights"5
advanced the cause of secular humanism, in lock step with democracy. Democracy
emerged as a viable form of governance when individualism and rationalism accorded
man with abilities previously possessed only by deities. Scholars of nationalism, while
disagreeing about much, almost universally affirm this notion of nationalism as filling the
void left by religion. These broader trends also fed into notions of democratic
governance and rule of law. In fact, Harold Berman called individualism, rationalism and
nationalism "the Triune Deity of Democracy."
The implications of these "modern" ideas permeated the globe. Even those nation
states that didn't "modernize" following the pattern of the West were swept up by
changes in social structure. Bernard Lewis illustrates this distinction between traditional
society and the nation sate. Modernization destroyed the whole apparatus, or "consensual
order" that had previously operated in traditional society. In that setting, there were all
sorts of orders in society that were well-entrenched and could exercise a restraining
influence. To illustrate his point, Lewis uses the example of the report of the French
ambassador in Turkey in 1786, who pointed out the sultan had nothing like the power of
the French king, but instead had to consult the military chiefs, the religious chiefs, and
the heads of departments before making important decisions.8 With the coming of
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modernity, these traditional checks and balances were eroded. The centralization of
power strengthened the autocrat and gave him all the methods of surveillance and
repression common to the nation state.9 Centralized autocracy significantly differs in
scope from its pre-modern predecessor, just as democracy too represented a departure
from past governance.
Some argue nationalism, a key unifying conceptual framework in the 1800s, was
conceived in order to sell this centralization of power.10 Europe, having recovered from
Napoleon's misadventures in 1815, was none the less fundamentally changed by the
experience, and the inability to return to an exact status quo. With the emergence of a
united Germany in 1871, nearly all of Europe was organized into nation states, with an
accompanying national identity. What was the impact of this nationalism? The answer
centers on the question of identity. When a majority of the constituents buy into the idea
of releasing their small group identity and being subsumed under a larger rubric,
everything changes. Being Italian took on more meaning than being Venetian.
Venetians bought into the idea of a united Italy as an important sense of identity.
Nationalism brought the power of shared identity to bear in a political sense with
amazing consequences. Newly emerging in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
these nation states have been referred to by Leonard Dudley in stripped down terms as
"new national information networks."11
The advent of greater communication capabilities, coupled with transportation
innovations, facilitated the projection of power and increased both the scope and depth of
9

Bernard Lewis, interview by Ken Meyers, Mars Hill Audio Journals (November 2002).
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 2006).
11
Leonard Dudley, The Word and the Sword: How Techniques of Information and Violence Have Shaped
our World (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1991), 317.
10

57
international relations. Previously remote cultures and populations were subdued and
subsumed by the European empires. With a sense of identity shaped by European
nationalism, Europeans accepted the "white man's burden" and set about the task of
civilizing the globe by setting up distant outposts of colonial power. Europeans had gone
out into the world, exploring and mapping the globe with ardor from the 1400s forward.
True of the earlier era of exploration, it was also true during the era of colonization. By
1900, it is no exaggeration to say that "the peoples of Europe and European stock
overseas dominated the globe."12 Latin America housed Spain and Portugal, North
America housed the British and the French, the British had rooms in India while the
Spaniards were found in the Philippines. The United States forcibly "opened" Japan to
trade, while Britain fought the Opium Wars in China. The Dutch took up residence in
Southeast Asia and carved up sections of Africa. That continent was also segmented by
French and British colonial interests. The Middle East, as well, was divided into
segments of various European national interests. Europeans imposed national borders,
along with their governance styles. While most texts couch the Europeans as exploiters,
one should remember the cash flow spreadsheet rarely worked in favor of the colonizer,
leading to the famous British cry "No more Indias!" Whatever the motivations, there can
be no doubt that colonization had far-reaching implications for antidemocracy, as is
especially seen during the second counterwave of 1957-1977, when the countercry to
imperialism shaped antidemocracy, a topic that we will return to in our discussion of the
second counterwave. The process of colonization bore direct impact on the shape of the
globe, especially when global war was instated.
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With the global extension of European nation states, European conflicts were also
exported with relative ease. In 1914, when divisions in the newly unified Germany and
the newly unified Italy were becoming evident, the European alliance structure ensured
that any conflict would be monumental. The Great War was devastating as the
industrialized nation states devoted entire economies to the craft of conflict. With its
broad scope, it destroyed much. In the words of one young British economist at the
Versailles peace conference that marked its end:
We are at the dead season of our fortunes. Our power of feeling or caring
beyond the immediate questions of our own material well-being is
temporarily eclipsed...We have been moved beyond endurance and need
rest. Never in the lifetime of men now living has the universal element in
the soul of men burnt so dimly.13
The economic depression that followed the Great War was preceded by a spiritual
one. Enlightenment ideas, faith in progress and man's positive evolution lay littered on
the battlefields, casualties in the ideational realm that echoed the many casualties in the
physical one. This sense of disillusionment can perhaps best be illustrated in the vast
changes that occurred in the realm of art. While in earlier eras art had rested on shared
experience, in the years after 1918 art worshipped disintegration. "In Surrealism even the
notion of the objective disappeared, let alone its representation. As one Surrealist put it,
the movement meant 'thought dictated in the absence of all control exerted by reason,
and outside all aesthetic or moral preoccupations.' Through chance, symbolism, shock,
suggestion and violence the Surrealists sought to go beyond consciousness itself."14 The
world of art, then, was exhibiting visually the challenge to liberal ideas that shook the
democratic establishment in the international community.
13
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When this Great Depression put on economic garments, liberal democracy
seemed ill-equipped for dealing with the challenges. If the universal element in the soul
of men burned dimly, so too did the soul of democracy. The Great War left a devastated
Europe, hell-bent on revenge instead of restoration. Into this void flowed new ideas, but
ones that proved poisonous to democracy. As J.M. Roberts has said "The disaster was a
promising setting for the communists and the fascists, who expected or advocated the
collapse of liberal civilization and now began to flap expectantly about the enfeebled
carcass."15
With the Communist revolution in full swing in Russia, communist evangelism
sparked fear, with its self-avowed international militarism. Added to this were the
equally strident fascist threats in Italy, Spain, and Germany. These ideologies have been
called "the utopia of those who had lost the old Utopias of the Enlightenment, the
programme of those who had lost faith in other programmes, the prop of those who had
lost the support of older political and social certainties."16 With the strident recovery of
Germany and the assertive rise of Japan, global conflict once again enveloped the world.
It was a truly dark time for those who had so fervently believed in the good will
and perfection of humanity, embodied by the ideas of the Enlightenment. Communism
offered a short cut to modernity that promised to side step the problematic inequality that
plagued liberal democracies with unfettered capitalism. Fascism, on the other hand,
represented a strength of character and decisive leadership that appealed to those shaken
by the instability in post-war liberal democracies. Liberal democracy began its retreat.
15
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The details of World War II are not especially relevant to this discussion, but the
state of the world at its close bears direct importance. While the conflict again spread to
some of the European colonies, it was the Japanese who had the more immediate impact
on colonial holdings at the war's end. By founding the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere during their rise, the Japanese pillaged the colonies of needed raw materials, but
also made it difficult for colonial powers after the war to return to the status quo ante by
delegating issues of local governance. These Asian nations were in no way prepared to
accept the colonizers anew in the post-war period. The African nations followed suit,
demanding independence from their colonial overlords. This post-WWII independence
movement introduced new levels of uncertainty in the governance structures of colonized
states that had been delineated on a map, but struggled to formulate a national identity.
The death of the European empires began a torturous journey for many of the former
colonies, as the new nation states tried to forge an independent identity in an uncertain
world. For these newly minted nations, the struggle for identity was complicated by
complex realities. On the one hand, the impetus was strong to invent a national identity
apart from the colonizers. In most cases, the colonial overlords were well-established,
Western democracies who sought to inculcate some sort of democratic institutions in
their colonies. Independence, then, called for a new nationalism to forge a new kind of
national identity.
Nationalists texts were addressed both to 'the people' who were said to
constitute the nation and to the colonial maters whose claim to rule
nationalism questioned. To both, nationalism sought to demonstrate the
falsity of the colonial claim that the backward peoples were culturally
incapable of ruling themselves in the conditions of the modern world.
Nationalism denied the alleged inferiority of the colonized people; it also
asserted that a backward nation could 'modernize' itself while retaining its
cultural identity. It thus produced a discourse in which, even as it
challenged the colonial claim to political domination, it also accepted the
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very intellectual premises of 'modernity' on which colonial domination
was based.
The nexus of modernization, liberation, and nationalism in the decolonization process
proved challenging, as this new nationalism often married antidemocracy, in forms
recognized as national strains of communism or fascism, in the quest for a national
identity distinct from the colonizers.
Thus, the impact of these trends of nationalism and modernization, colonization
and decolonization are interwoven with the story of the counterwaves. They form the
historical backdrop against which the rise and dominance of antidemocratic sentiment
was played out. In the case of both counterwaves the voice of democracy was
overwhelmed by the voices of alternative government choices. It still remains to examine
these periods of clustered antidemocratic sentiment.

The Counterwaves
The discussion now turns to a more mechanical description of the time clusters
when antidemocratic governance experienced its greatest strength. As mentioned
previously, Samuel Huntington noted these "reverse waves" in passing, but defined them
differently. I argue that Huntington did not define the counterwave phenomenon broadly
enough. Huntington's focus and purpose was different than mine, but his brief
exploration of the counterwave offers an instructive counterpoint to illuminate the
rationale underlying this project. Huntington defined the counterwave in terms of those

democracies that had been converted in the recent wave of democracy, a narrow
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conception of the counterwave.18 This project, on the other hand, opens things up to look
at the impact of antidemocracy on all types of polity, from varying levels of democracy
through autocracy. This question gives a broader range in which to judge the true power
of democracy, as a concept that either attracts or repels, across time.
In the century that followed, in spite of sputters and missteps, the overall trend
reflects an increase in the mean polity score in the international system. The mean polity
score reached its first peak in 1921, when the average polity score was 2.13 for the 62
nations in the system. After this long and fairly steady climb in the mean polity score,
1922 signaled the beginning of a precipitous decline in the polity score. This was the
beginning of the first counterwave, a cluster of antidemocratic sentiment that represented
the reversal of democracy's advance through the nineteenth century and signaled the
beginning of the first challenge to the liberal ideals that had been birthed and grown
throughout the Enlightenment.
The first counterwave (CW1), as seen in Graph 1, occurred from roughly 1922
until 1940, spanning nearly 2 decades. During that time the mean polity dropped from its
height of 2.05 in 1921 to a low of-2.24 in 1940, a reversal that took the mean polity score
back 70 years in history to the year 1870. Of further interest, we find a relatively
constant number of nations in the international system during this period.
18
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Graph 1. Mean polity score, 1800-2006.

In 1921 there were 62 recognized nation states and in 1940, there were 63. In the
interceding years 8 new nations were created, but others were absorbed keeping the
overall numbers of nations in the international system fairly steady.
The second counterwave (CW2) also occurred over a roughly 20 year period.
After reaching a low in 1940, the polity score began to climb again. By 1946 it had
climbed back into positive territory again, to a meager .09. It sputtered into negative
territory again from 1949-1956, before a brief re-emergence onto the positive side of
things again in 1957. The second sustained counterwave, however, began the following
year. In 1958, the score had dipped to -.44 and continued a rather steady decline until
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bottoming out in 1977 at -2.59, an even deeper decline than experienced in the first
counterwave.
The counterwaves as distinct bands
How are the counterwave periods of time any different from the rest of history?
How is democratic failure distributed across time? Democracy, or those nations scoring
from 1 to 10 on the polity scale, fails 145 times over the course of the time studied. Of
these 145 democratic failures, 72 of them take place during counterwave time periods,
leaving 73 that take place outside of these time periods. This is made significant by the
fact that the counterwaves account for only 18% of the total time studied. In other words,
nearly half of all democratic failures are clustered in these narrow time bands. As an
archeologist digging through the rubble of democratic failure, while shards of destroyed
democracy are sprinkled throughout the soil layers of history, one discovers
concentrations of shattered democracy in the time bands of 1922-1940 and 1957-1977.
The global reach of the counterwaves
To further the exploration of the importance of the counterwaves, it is useful to
explore its geographic reach. While most of this work is focused specifically on those
nations who reach failure threshold, a polity drop of 3 points, it is important to include
here all those nations that experienced negative polity change during the counterwave.
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Figure 1. Nations experiencing negative polity change during counterwaves. (1=CW1,2=CW2, 3=Both)

It should be noted that some of these countries, shown in Figure 1, only
experienced slight negative polity change in the counterwave years. By way of
illustration, take the examples of the first counterwave. Six of the nations (Afghanistan,
Cuba, Haiti, Ireland, Mongolia and the USSR) only experienced a slight (2 point) drop in
their polity scores. For 2 of these nations (Afghanistan whose autocracy deepened to -10
in 1945 and Haiti, who declined more precipitously in 1946) the counterwave initiated a
process that was brought to completion in the years just outside CW1. The remaining 4
went on to recover. Ireland, which had dipped to 8 in 1933, recovered its perfect score of
10 in 1952. Cuba, a weak democracy at 3 that dipped down to 1 in 1928, recovered its
previous polity score in 1933. Mongolia and the USSR both experienced deepening
autocracy in the counterwave years, but recovered their less autocratic score of -7 in 1952
and 1953 respectively. Even these slight variations, and the subsequent recoveries,
indicate the power of the counterwave years across the board, in strong and weak
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democracies and even in autocracies, in initiating a more extreme virulence against
democracy.
But the extant literature ignores this phenomenon. The literature on
antidemocracy largely focuses on the extreme cases of Hitler's Germany and Stalin's
Russia.19 Others focus on antidemocracy generically, providing important scholarship on
issues of various types of autocratic regimes but without looking at their prevalence in
particular time bands.

These are important contributions but they neglect the

fundamental scope of the counterwave impact. While the transience and resilience of the
downturn varied by individual case, which will be addressed in upcoming chapters, the
prevalence of the downturn has not been fully described. Seeing the geography of the
counterwaves reinforces not only their importance, but also their prevalence. Figure 1
reminds us of the impact of the counterwave, even upon nations that did not actually
reach failure threshold. From the map we can see the impact of negative polity change in
South America, all of Europe, Central America, huge segments of the island nations, as
well as the Middle East. Africa certainly did not escape the impact of negative polity
change, and Asia was involved in its near entirety. The broader geographical spread
points to international trends at work, and yet these broad trends of antidemocratization
have been understudied.

19

Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966); Robert
Tucker, "The Question of Totalitarianism," Slavic Review 20, no. 3 (October 1961): 377-382.
20
Juan Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).
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Figure 2. Nations impacted by the counterwaves. (l=nations failing only in CW1, 2=nations failing only
in CW2, 3=nations failing outside the counterwaves, 4=nations failing in a counterwave and again
subsequently)

Comparing Counterwave 1 and Counterwave 2
Having established both the global reach and the distinctiveness of the
counterwave phenomena jointly, I will now turn to comparisons of them individually.
Do CW 1 and CW 2 reflect the same phenomenon? Are they another example of history
repeating itself? Do they look the same? Do they look different? Did both counterwaves
impact the same geographical regions? What about the composition of the
counterwaves? Was CW 1 composed of the same types of failures as CW 2? Was the
mechanism for the polity decline consistent for both?
Differing geography of the counterwaves
The counterwaves share in common a wide geographic reach. Neither was
confined to one continent, or even 2, as can be seen in Figure 2. The counterwaves were
both global. However, it is not fair to say they are identical. There are important
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differences, even from the standpoint of geography. Western Europe was swamped by
the first counterwave, but not as effected by the second. Africa and Asia were largely
outsiders in the first counterwave, while clearly inside participants in the second.
Interestingly, both counterwaves lapped the shores of Central America, while only the
second had any great impact on the Middle East.
This reinforces the notion that not only were the counterwaves global phenomena
collectively, they were also global phenomena individually. However, the difference in
the locus of the global phenomena indicates the importance of contrasting them in further
detail.
Composition of the counterwaves
As seen in the first counterwave, a higher percentage of high level democracies
failed than in CW2. In fact, nearly half of all high level democracies during the 18 year
period of CW1 experienced failure. This is in contrast to 31% of all high level
democracies during the 20 year period of CW2 that experienced failure.

In CWI, the

nations that failed had achieved the highest level of institutionalized authority
characteristics measured for democracies before their failure. In addition, they had all
been high level democracies for at least 8 years before experiencing failure. In CW2,
only 2 level 10 democracies failed, France and Malaysia. During the second
counterwave, high level democracies were more resilient than they had been during
CWI, with level 10 democracies proving the most resilient of all.
The other 2 components of democratic failure, mid-level and low level democratic
failures, were quite comparable in failure rate when comparing CWI and CW2. In CWI
55% of all democracies characterized as mid-level failed. This is quite comparable to the
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60% of all democracies characterized as mid-level in CW2. This phenomenon will be
discussed in more depth in the chapter on dissonant democracy. The failure rate for low
level democracies remained constant for both CW1 and CW2. In both instances, it was
45%. Perhaps even more interesting, while the number of nations in the international
system ballooned between CW1 and CW2, the number of low level democracies
remained relatively constant.
Like the mid-level and low level democratic failure rate, autocratic deepening is
pretty consistent between the 2 counterwaves. In the first counterwave, 23 % of all
autocracies experienced a deepening of that autocracy, while in the second counterwave
that percentage dropped to 19%. This may seem like a false comparison since the
democracies are split out in subsets while all levels of autocracy are treated as a whole.
To allow for this, one can combine all levels of democracy and compare them with all
levels of autocracy. If we do this, we find that 48% of all nations that experienced any
level of democracy failed, while only 23% of nations experiencing any form of autocracy
experienced a deepening of the autocracy. While the deepening autocracy certainly
contributes to the counterwave phenomenon, it is quite evident democratic failure bears
greater responsibility for the counterwaves.
Interruptions in polity
At the risk of sounding like a broken record, at its heart, this dissertation is
concerned with describing change. Change in polity impacts the larger question of
stability. In the case of the nations under consideration for this study, some nations do
not have polity scores for the entire time span of the counterwaves. The answers to these
cases of the disappearing nations provide further distinctions between the counterwaves.

Why would a nation be missing? It could be that the nation was born during the
counterwave. This is certainly true of many nations during CW2 as nations declared
independence from colonizers. At the other end of the spectrum are those nations that
went out of existence, such as the Baltic nations and Poland, before reappearing on the
international stage at a later time. By far the largest culprit, however, is an interruption in
polity. Polity interruptions take on 3 basic subtypes. In some cases, such as with Hitler's
march across Europe, the nation has been taken over by an external actor. While these
external takeovers clearly demonstrate a failure in democratic governance, assigning a
precise polity score is difficult, so a -66 interruption code is the solution. Yet another
possibility is internal turmoil, such as civil war or lack of a coherent central government.
In such cases, these nations appear as -77 in the dataset until the situation is resolved.
For other countries, a state of flux ensues where a specific polity score can't be reached,
coded as -88. While these scenarios differ significantly in scope and impact, all types of
interruption represent grave instability. As such, the number of nations not present for
the entire span of time for the counterwaves can be one indicator of the amount of
upheaval in the international system. For the first counterwave, 27% of the countries
were not present for the entire time. In the second counterwave, we see that the number
of nations not present for the entire time increases dramatically. In fact, 42% of the
nations were not present over the entire time span of the second counterwave. These
various interruption codes give us both a way to measure the instability in the
international system, and a way to compare that instability between the counterwaves.
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Graph 2. Average polity score versus sums of interruptions.

As shown in Graph 2, interruptions also spiked around the counterwave time
spans. In the first counterwave, 25 observations were excluded because of external
takeover. In the second counterwave, the number of external takeovers is much lower.
Only 5 countries qualify as -66 during this time span. This is yet another indicator of the
differences between the 2 counterwaves. The interruptions in polity that characterized the
second counterwave were due to internal unrest (civil war and collapse of the state),
while direct external military intervention was a more prominent feature of C W 1 .

Increasing complexity, more moving parts
The world was a more complex place at the beginning of the second counterwave,
than at the onset of the first. One of the most obvious observations that need to be made
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Graph 3. Number of nation states versus mean polity score.

about the 2 counterwaves is the proliferation of nation states that occurred in the interim
between the first counterwave and the second, as can be seen in Graph 3.
During the years of the first counterwave (1922-1940), 70 states comprised the
international system. This stands in stark contrast to the number of nations in CW2. In
the time span from 1957-1977 there were 142 nations in the international system, in other
words the number of states in the system more than doubled. What happened to cause
this proliferation? The international system underwent a period of fragmentation. Larger
territorial entities broke into smaller component pieces. The biggest contributor to this
phase of fragmentation was decolonization. In the post WWII era, the international
system experienced a time of great flux and change. While upheaval in conflict is a
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foregone conclusion, the dramatic shifts that were sparked by WWII may seem less
obvious. In the aftermath of WWII, the great colonizing European nations lost sway over
their colonies. En masse, colonial holdings in Africa and Asia defected, declared
independence and embarked on the path of national governance. Many new nations were
born. In Graph 3, it is evident the sharpest spike in the birth of nations occurs during the
second counterwave. When the somewhat arbitrarily drawn boundary lines of the
colonial era proved untenable to governance, conflict erupted again. Civil wars, conflict
over power, and power vacuums all contributed to an era of chaos that approached
anarchy in some nations. Newly independent governments had to deal with myriad
issues that had been temporarily plastered over by the colonial rulers, who had oftentimes
dumped copious amounts of capital into the colonial empires.
This seismic movement marks a point of contrast from the first counterwave. The
flavor is different. While the first counterwave follows the march up to WWII, the
second counterwave mirrors the international aspects of the Cold War. It is safe to assert
that the world is a more complex place with 142 nations than it was with 70. This
increase in complexity, and in moving parts, is especially characteristic of the second
counterwave.

Conclusion
The counterwaves represent time bands of history when the tide of antidemocracy
rose precipitously. Impacting even autocracies, the counterwaves subsumed democracies
of all levels and degrees to an even greater extent. The counterwave was global in reach,
and distinctly recognizable on the canvas of history.
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That canvas gave color to the counterwaves. Against the white hope in mankind
kindled by the Enlightenment, the counterwaves strike more somber shades. Faith in
individualism, rationality, forward progress had stoked the fires of modernity. With
modernization came the emergence of the nation state, with innovative centralized power
structures. Secular humanism struck a divide between belief in the divine and the newly
emerging societies, while borrowing religious capital in the terms of fervor and
passionate belief.
When the giant Enlightenment fell during World War I, he scarred the
international system with the lasting imprint of his fall. Disillusionment reigned. New
ideologies were birthed in the turmoil. Communism and fascism stepped in to interpret
events and bring new promise. These new ideologies, antidemocratic in their foundation
and applications, gave birth to the first counterwave.
While Europe may have been the epicenter of the first counterwave,
antidemocracy rang around the world. The first counterwave followed the world's first
real experiment with globalized conflict. Antidemocracy was built upon the modern
ideologies of communism and fascism, which fed off the instability of that conflict.
The 2 counterwaves are different in some important ways. And yet, the second
counterwave also echoes the first. It followed a period of globalized conflict, but was
experienced by a somewhat different set of nation states. Some who experienced the first
counterwave were inoculated in 1945, but for many other nations, antidemocracy was
still relevant. Antidemocracy was still built on the echoes of communism and fascism.
In the antidemocratic movements that swept Africa, Asia, parts of Europe and Latin
America from 1957-1977, both the communist and fascist echoes strongly presided.
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Newly independent states often aligned with either the far left or the far right as the third
great globalized conflict, the Cold War, got underway.
Not all nation states were equally vulnerable during the counterwaves. One of the
most interesting findings of the study of these counterwaves was high level democracy's
disproportionate vulnerability. The counterwaves represent one important way to
conceive of democratic failures. In order to add to the understanding of democracy's
vulnerability, however, it is also helpful to study failure against the backdrop of broader
history. The next chapter turns to an in-depth look specifically at high level democratic
failure, both inside and outside of the counterwaves.
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CHAPTER IV
WHEN COHERENT DEMOCRACY FAILS

Clusters of antidemocracy reached full concentration in the counterwave years,
but antidemocracy escapes the confines of these time bands. In seeking to more fully
describe the phenomenon of democratic failure, we too must leave the confines of the
counterwave years. For the rest of this work, the counterwave will serve as a primary
frame of reference and point of comparison, but our focus will shift to a broader
conception of antidemocracy, as experienced by democracies of 3 varying concentrations.
Failure in the most concentrated form of democracy, high level democracy, leads off this
trio.
As mentioned in previous chapters, the Polity dataset measures the
institutionalized authority characteristics present in governance structures. In particular,
it focuses on the degree to which restraint of authority is present in the institutions of
government. Restraint in governance is a characteristic of particular import to
democracy, which finds its legitimacy in the bridle of the people. In non-democracies,
legitimacy might be found in bloodlines, military power, ideology, or party membership,
each of which offer their own rules of engagement, but only in democracy does
legitimacy rest expressly in the people's choice, a mediated expression of the rule by the
many.
High level democracies, to return to our subject, are those polities organized
around this concept of restraint. To the highest extent, this grouping is internally
coherent. High level democracy can be operationalized as a polity "in which (a) political
participation is fully competitive, (b) executive recruitment is elective and (c) constraints
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on the chief executive are substantial."1 In other words, institutions have been
constructed to support the underlying ideals of democracy, namely regularized elections
with a continuing atmosphere of restrained executive power. Ideals, as we have
discussed in previous chapters, shape institutions. This, of course, links the study of the
failure of democratic governmental institutions to the faltering of the democratic ideal.

Examining Decline in High Level Democracies
While the concept of democracy has been around for centuries, high level
democracy is a fairly recent innovation. The United States formed the vanguard in 1809,
but only in the later years did high level democracy emerge across a broader scale.
In Graph 4, the relative novelty of the onset of high level democracy as a force in the
international system is demonstrated. High level democracies, non-existent in 1800,
comprised less than 10% of all the nation states in the world system until the twentieth
century. While only 9 nations were high level democracies in the 1800s, 66 more would
join their ranks in the 1900s with 10 more joining after the millennial change. Over the
course of the time covered by this study, 86 nations have been high level democracies at
one point or another, some remaining so for the duration of the time under study while
others have reverted to lower levels of democratic governance, or even fallen into
autocracy. There are more high level democracies today than at any other point in
history. By the end of 2006, high level democracies comprised over 40% of the world
system.
1

The Polity IV User's Manual describes as "coherent" those having a score of 7 or higher. I have raised
that threshold, however, and use 8 and higher as my definition of coherent democracy.
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Graph 4. The percentage of high level democracies in the world system.

The chapter focuses on the failure of these high level democracies, as tracked in Graph 4.
Even though it has been discussed in earlier portions, it is probably good to recap the
description of high level democracies. High level democracies are not perfect. Nations
can be high level democracies, even before they let women vote.

The United States was

a high level democracy, even during the years before the civil war with institutionalized
slavery. There is some part of us that thinks this ought not to be. In our minds we equate
democracy with liberty, justice and equality of opportunity. Indeed, democracy does

cohabitate with these ideals, and yet high level democracy has existed
2

Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no.
3 (Summer 1983): 212.
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even when these ideals were not perfectly expressed. Just as democracy as an ideal has
evolved over time, so too has high level democracy. So, how can we deal with the
changes in what high level democracy has looked like across the span of this study?
There are 2 concepts crucial to our discussion of how this can be. The first of
these is historical context. Was Athens a democracy? Certainly not by any standards that
we would accept today, and yet when comparing its governance style to those of all the
nations in its sphere of influence, it was distinctively democratic in the way that it made
its decisions. Was the United States a democracy even when it had institutionalized
slavery? If we use the same format, looking at participation in governance, the U.S. was
a recognizable democracy, very different in its decision making processes than any of its
contemporaries.
More importantly, however, is a return to our focus on institutionalized authority
characteristics. In measuring democracy, as mentioned before, this study has utilized
only the observable institutional environment. In the case of high level democracies,
there are few institutionalized hangovers from either incomplete democratic
transformation or autocratic remnants. So, while high level democratic governance is not
perfect when compared to ideal democratic governance, it is institutionally distinct.

General Findings
There are 35 nation states that represent 42 incidents of high level democratic
failure, as seen in Figure 3. Obviously, there are some repeat offenders within the ranks
of the high level democratic failures. Greece fails 3 times, (1915, 1936, 1949) as does
Pakistan (1958, 1977, 1999). France (1940, 1958) Turkey (1971, 1980) and Lesotho
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Figure 3. High level democratic failures.

(1970, 1998) have each experienced failure as a high level democracy twice. The subject
of repeat offenders will be covered in more depth in the next chapter, where repeated
high level democratic failure will be situated within the context of the repeated failure of
mid and low level democracies.
Falling fast and far
Within the 35 nation states that have experienced high level democratic failure,
there are 2 identifiable subsets. There are those members that barely meet the qualifying
criteria, experiencing a minor slide of only 3 or 4 points in their polity score. Given the
high level of institutionalization of democracy within this group, it would be reasonable
to assume that when failure occurs it occurs as a downgrading of democracy, an erosion
of democracy to a lower level. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that most of the high
level democratic failures would consist of minor slides. Instead, this group is a distinct
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minority, making up only 14% of the failures. The rest of the high level democracies
failed dramatically. In fact, only 11 of the cases maintained even the lowest levels of
democracies, the rest swung over into the autocratic territory. In other words, only 30%
of these high end democracies remained democracies in any sense of the word. The other
70% experienced such decline that they were characterized as autocracies. Even when
we include those that experienced minor levels of democratic failure, the average polity
drop was 10 points. Of the majority of high level democracies that experienced deep
democratic failure, the shift was so profound that they were in the bottom quadrant of
autocracy after having occupied the heights of democracy.
Of equal importance to the depth of the failure is the rapidity of the failure. Have
high end democracies historically failed gradually or quickly? A gradual decline in
democratic values, with a slow deprivation of democratic rights seemed the only way a
populace who had instituted democratic governance would tolerate the deprivation of
such rights, having been lulled into a false sense of security. This assumption proved
incorrect. The vast majority of the declines were precipitous, taking place over the
course of a year. In fact, only 4 of the cases took longer than a year. So, not only were
the failures deep, they were dramatic. High level democracies fall far and fast.
These findings are of particular concern in a world where high level democracies
now make up nearly half of the system. The implications of cause for concern become
even more apparent when we look at the nature of these high level democracies.
As mentioned before, high level democracies are composed of nations with a
polity score of 8, 9, or 10. As one might expect, level 10 democracies have experienced
3

The cases referenced are: Finland 1930, Estonia 1933, Ecuador 2000, Venezuela 2001, Greece 1949, and
Sri Lanka 1982.
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the greatest level of stability. Unfortunately, the number of level 10 democracies in the
international system is quite small. In 2006, there were 35 nation states that were number
10 democracies, representing only 21% of the international system. Of even more
concern, these nations were concentrated in the West. Of the non-Western nations who
are number 10 democracies, only 5 nations were both non-Western and non-island
states.4
Why is this of concern? Because while level 10 democracies have experienced
failure, most especially concentrated within the first counterwave as will be discussed
later in this chapter, level 8 and 9 democracies make up the larger contingent of high
level democratic failure. Table 1 lists all the high level democracies that have
experienced failure. This table demonstrates a further 2 things. First of all, even number
10 democracies are not immune to failure. Secondly, level 8 and 9 high level
democracies are even more vulnerable. This should raise our concerns about the impacts
of a future counterwave on high level democracy.
One might justifiably ask how these high end democratic failures are distributed
relative to the counterwave. Interestingly, these high end failures seem to happen most
frequently during counterwaves. In fact, nearly 60% of the failures occur during the 2
counterwaves. This is especially striking since the sum total of the time represented in
the 2 counterwaves, a total of 40 years, only represents 18% of the total time studied.
Sixty percent of all high level democratic failures occur in a time span that represents
18% of the total time.

4

These countries are Chile, Cos,ta Rica, Uruguay, Mongolia and Israel.

83
Table
Year
1876
1886
1915
1926
1930
1933
1933
1936
1939
1940
1940
1940
1940
1947
1949
1958
1958
1958
1960
1961
1962
1963
1963
1966
1969
1970
1971
1971
1974
1977
1980
1982
1987
1992
1994
1996
1998
1999
2000
2000
2001
2006

1. High level democraitic failures
Hi Low
Country
New Zealand
10 4
Colombia
8 -3
Greece
8
1
Poland
8 -3
Finland
10 7
Austria
8 -1
Estonia
10 6
Greece
8 -8
Belgium
10 -66
France
10 -9
Denmark
10 -66
Netherlands
10 -66
Norway
10 -66
Czechoslovakia
10 -1
Greece
8 4
France
10 5
Pakistan
8 -7
Sudan
8 -7
Laos
8 -1
South Korea
8 -7
Myanmar (Burma)
8 -6
Cyprus
8 0
Dominican Republic 8 0
Nigeria
8 -7
Malaysia
10 1
Lesotho
9 -9
Turkey
8 -2
Uruguay
8 3
Bangladesh
8 -2
Pakistan
8 -7
Turkey
9 -5
Sri Lanka
8 5
Fiji
9 -3
8 -3
Peru
Gambia
8 -7
Niger
8 -6
Lesotho
8 0
Pakistan
8 -6
Ecuador
9 6
Solomon Islands
8 -77
Venezuela
9 5
9 -5
Thailand

Delta Fail time
6
11
7
11
3
9
4
16
~

19
~
~
—

11
4
5
15
15
9
15
14
8
8
15
9
18
10
5
10
15
14
3
12
11
15
14
8
14
3
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Graph 5. Percentage of high level democratic failure versus the average polity score.

What does this mean? Well, as shown in Graph 5, the highest percentage of high
level democratic failures occurred at the end of the first counterwave, when nearly 45%
of all the high level democracies in the international system experienced failure. While
the same graph shows the continuance of high level democratic failure during the second
counterwave and beyond, it demonstrates the particular toxicity of the first counterwave
to high level democracy.
The relationship between the counterwaves and high level democratic failure is
even more striking when comparing the percentage of high level democracies in the
world system to the counterwave years. In returning to Graph 4, one sees that the
percentage of high level democracy in the world system tracks with both counterwaves,
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especially in the period of 1922-1940, but also we see the decrease of high level
democracy in the world system in the second counterwave, 1957-1977.
Distinctions of high level democracy's progression and recession
As has already been mentioned, a particularly disproportionate number of high
level democracies suffered failure during the counterwaves. There are some interesting
distinctions between CW 1 (1922-1940) and CW 2 (1958-1977). During the first
counterwave, many of the high level democracies that had been born in the early 1900's
failed. While high level democracies had been coming into existence at a rate of several
a year, by the onset of the first counterwave in 1922, the birth rate of high level
democracies lurched to a halt. In fact, during the first counterwave no new high level
democracies were born.
In contrast, during the years of the second counterwave, high level democracies
continued to come into existence. Oftentimes, however, the life spans of these high level
democracies were quite short-lived, as decolonized nation states came to grips with the
complexities of their new-found independence.
Even those high level democracies born during the second counterwave that
escaped failure in the counterwave itself, have proven less than resilient in the
intervening years. In fact, only 29% of the high level democracies born during the
second counterwave have managed to survive through 2006. Thus, 61% of the high level
democracies born during the second counterwave had failed by 2006.
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Mechanism of Democratic Failure
Looking at the Table 2, we can see some striking differences in the way high level
democracies failed. Again, there are important contrasts between the first and second
counterwaves. In the first counterwave, external takeovers were the most common form
of high level democratic failure. While the counterwave moved beyond Hitler's march,
the aggression of the Third Reich bears the lion's share of responsibility for high level
democratic failure in the first counterwave, with repression and coups playing a less
prominent role. Civil war is completely absent as a cause of high level democratic failure
in CW1. In contrast, external takeovers had no role to play in the second counterwave.
Here, coups play the leading role, with repression as a secondary cause and civil wars a
distant third. When we move look at those high level democratic failures that took place
outside the counterwave, we find yet another striking difference, with repression taking
the lead role as a cause of high level democratic failure, coups as a secondary cause and
external takeovers and civil wars tied for a distant third place.

Table 2. Mechanism of failure for high level democracies
TIME PERIOD
MECHANISM
Counterwave 1
External Takeover 60%
Repression 20%
Coup 20%
Civil War 0%
Counterwave 2
External Takeover 0%
Repression 34.3%
Coup 53.3%
Civil War 13.3%
Outside Counterwaves External Takeover 6%
Repression 50%
Coup 38%
Civil War 6%
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Objections to these Findings
I suspect few would argue studying high level democratic failure is unimportant.
I, also, suspect that this chapter will still manage to find controversy, centering around 2
main objections.
The first objection centers on the argument that these aren't high level
democracies. Who in their right mind would render 1960 Laos a high level democracy?
Since when can Ecuador be considered a high level democracy? This discussion is
entirely uninteresting because it includes many countries that are clearly not high level
democracies. These clearly are not consolidated democracies, objectors might say.
How, one might ask, can we recognize a consolidated democracy? Isn't one of
the primary characteristics, aside from its coherence, the fact that it hasn't failed. I'm
certainly not the first one to observe these problems with the whole concept of
consolidation, but let us admit from the outset that the consolidation argument is not a
valid one, since one of the primary means of identifying a consolidated democracy is by
noticing it hasn't experienced failure, an essentially circular argument.
Setting aside the issue of consolidation, let's acknowledge that not all of the
countries that make up the high level democracy group are equal. In fact, even from the
standpoint of coherence, there is some variance in this group.
Having looked at the constituents of high level democratic failure, some may
argue that the level 8 and 9 democracies are unimportant, and the only ones to study and
include in an examination of democratic failure are those who have achieved a score of
5
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Facilitating Conditions," in Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in
Comparative Perspective, ed. Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela (Notre
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10. Obviously, I think the weight of the evidence lies in the opposite view. It is rare to
be introduced to even high level democracy without some remnant of past imperfections.
Only 17 nations out of the 86 nation states that have ever been high level democracies,
managed to debut at 10 when they first became high level democracies. Eleven of the 17
did so after 1945, when democracy had won a significant battle against fascism. So, we
see it is quite rare to have one's house in full order even when it comes to institutional
coherence within a democratic government, upon the initial entrance into high level
democracy. The United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Ireland, and
France all debuted at less than 10, and yet today all are vibrant democracies. The
possibility to be a vibrant democracy lies within each nation who reaches the threshold of
high level democracy, and yet we somehow are tempted to think differently of the
potential of Ghana and Indonesia, both level 8 as of 2006, than we do of the United
Kingdom, an 8 in 1901. And yet, perfectly coherent democracies are today present in
Europe, Asia, Latin America and Africa.
A second likely objection argues that these aren't democratic failures. When
looking at this list we see Hitler's European conquest as the demise of the highest level
democracies. This doesn't constitute a failure of democracy. As anyone can readily
attest, when the threat was removed, these nations readily returned to democratic
governance. In addition, some of the cases above were clearly not democratic failure in
the traditional sense. While democracy may have faltered, it clearly did not fail,
objectors may say.
Here's my defense. In thinking about Europe during WWII, one has only to ask:
Were Danes living under democratic governance in 1940? What about the Dutch?

89
Norwegians? Of course they were not. They were living under the Third Reich, in
conditions that could hardly be called democratic. This qualifies as a failure of
democracy. It does, however, raise interesting questions about the stamina of the
democratic ideal when trampled by external forces, a subject which could form the
subject of another dissertation. It also highlights the ebb and flow of democracy as a
palatable idea, as discussed in the second chapter of this work.
Another objection argues that some of the cases aren't sufficient to constitute
democratic failure. We could take the example of Finland, as an example, which some
have argued is a case of resilient democracy, not of democratic failure.6 Let's simply talk
about this example in order to elucidate why it should be classified as a democratic
failure. This is one of the more complex cases of democratic failure and requires a bit
more historical background to make heads or tails of the situation, since it occurred in the
years following a civil war in Finland, which began in 1918, that had also centered on
anti-Communist sentiments. No discussion of the failure of democracy in Finland can
make sense without a discussion of the Lapua movement. This movement, initially more
nationalist and anti-communist in nature but turning to more extremist sentiments,
confronted a Communist Youth Movement in late November 1929 and made a violent
end to the meeting and resulting in a demand for the ban of all communist activities. The
movement then spread nationwide and by 1930 the government outlawed all communist
newspapers, called new elections in which the Communists could not take part, and
passed anti-Communist laws that resulted in constitutional changes limiting the freedom
6
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of the press. Thus began the democratic downturn. It was followed by a hotly contested
presidential election in 1931, where the Lapua movement promised violence if their
candidate was not elected, and were thus able to strong-arm their way into the
presidency.9 But, their dominance did not prove long-lasting. In early 1932, an uprising
occurred in a small town north of Helsinki and was quickly supported by the Lapua. The
call was for a new patriotic government. The state responded quickly, the army, though
divided, backed the government and the rebels surrendered as the movement failed to
garner public support. In the wake of this violence, the Lapua movement was banned and
support for parliament and rule of law was retained.10 Even so, another 13 years passed
before the nation would return to the high level of democracy that it possessed before the
Lapua movement's initiative. Still, in 1944 Finland once again became a number 10
democracy and has remained one ever since.
While Finland's experience was indeed one of a lesser extent of democratic
failure, we can see from our brief history given that the impact was quite evident. It also
serves to demonstrate the difference between high level democracy, and the lower
variants. Even though Finland did not descend into abject autocracy, the decrease in
quality of democracy is important to consider, and still meets the failure threshold.

Conclusion
High level democracies have been particularly vulnerable to en masse failure, as
shown by their presence in the counterwaves. When high level democracy fails, it has
8
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also failed dramatically. With few exceptions, the failure of high level democracy has
been catastrophic as the polity pendulum swings far into autocracy. This trend is true of
level 10 democracies, but even more so of high level democracies with less than perfect
scores.
Recent trends have placed high level democracy at the forefront of polity type in
the international system, but these less than perfect democracies still constitute a large
portion of high level democracy's forward progress. History would teach us that, just as
these polities made rapid transitions to democracy, their demise can indeed up rapid as
well.
Having tracked the trends of high level democratic decline, we will now turn our
attention to the way dissonant democracies fare, to examine points of similarity and
difference with their more institutionally coherent high level democracy counterparts.
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CHAPTER V
WHEN DISSONANT DEMOCRACY FAILS

Having studied failure in democracies that are coherent, we now turn our attention
to failure in dissonant democracies. What is a dissonant democracy? It is a political state
of organization in which not all components mesh. That is to say, the aspects of
democracy are disjointed and confused. There is dissonance in the system. An
institutionally coherent democracy, operationally defined, consists of fully competitive
political participation, where those in power are both elected and constrained.1 In
institutionally incoherent democracies, at least one of these aspects is less than fully
developed. In these dissonant democracies, elements clash. Internal cohesion is absent.
An inherently competitive situation results, not between competing political actors but
between incomplete democracy and incomplete autocracy. By definition, then, one
would expect these incoherent democracies to be either transient or to experience a high
level of conflict, whether violently expressed or otherwise. One aim of this chapter is to
discover whether this expectation is realized.
Dissonant democracies have not been wholly ignored by scholars. Exercising a
full range of philological creativity, scholars have variously referred to low and mid-level
democracies as hybrid regimes,2 pseudo-democracies,3 semi-democracies,4 illiberal
1
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Third World Quarterly 25, no. 6 (2004): 1061-1078.
4
William Case, "Can the "Halfway House" Stand? Semidemocracy and Elite Theory in Three Southeast
Asian Countries," Comparative Politics 28, no. 4 (July 1996): 437-464.
2
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democracies5 and incomplete democracies.6 These variously labeled entities have not
been entirely ignored as to their propensity to experience failure. In fact, dissonant
democracies have been broadly described as unstable. Several scholars, in fact, have
noted that coherence on either end of the spectrum, whether as a democracy or autocracy,
is associated with stability. Studies have looked at newly formed dissonant democracies
in terms of propensity for conflict, and of course, the more dominant question, at the
obstacles to their consolidation. If one had to sum up what all these scholars conclude,
we could safely assert broad agreement that dissonant democracies are problematic.
Our focus on dissonant democracies will center upon a division of the term. Our
definition of a failure in democracy, namely a 3 point fall in the democracy score, creates
3 subcategories of democracy, high level democracy, mid-level democracy and low level
democracy. In the highest tier, most elements of democracy are present with an utter
absence of autocratic elements. When we descend into mid-level and low level
democracies, however, the dissonance becomes obvious. Here, we find an incomplete
democratization process in competition with remaining elements of autocracy.
5
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To consolidate the idea of mid-level and low level democracy, let's look at some
specific examples. The failure of mid-level democracy in Chile in 1973 has been much
studied, because of the implication of external involvement. Even in the 1800s, Chile
was moving towards democracy and enjoyed regular competitive elections for civilians,
even in the midst of a civil war in 1891. After regressing to authoritarianism in 1924-32,
democratic governance was re-instituted and remained stable until the Allende
government, in the late 1960s, experienced "polarization, disorder and breakdown."10
With Pinochet's military takeover, the opposition was ruthlessly oppressed and
suppressed. Chile in the 1960s is a good example of mid-level democracy. It features
regularized elections cycles, constraints on executive power, but with an autocratic
undertow. The same could be said for other mid-level democracies that subsequently
experienced failure, from the French democracy in 1851 which succumbed to the coup of
Louis Napoleon, to Haiti's difficulties with sustaining democracy in the 1990s with the
ouster of Aristide.'l
In low level democracies, the accent falls more heavily on autocracy. Take, for
example, the case of Cambodia in 1997. Wracked with instability and autocratic
governance for years, in 1993 the United Nations organized elections, paving a slight
pathway toward democracy. The 2 main political factions, also militarized, shared power
until the approach of the next election, when only one would be in charge. Neither side
10
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was prepared to let go of power, so armed conflict was the result.

This backdrop of

conflict is echoed in many cases where barely expressed democracy is sucked under by
complex social, economic, and political undercurrents.
These examples highlight the differences between the coherent democracies
discussed in the previous chapter, and the dissonant democracies that will occupy our
time in this one. This chapter will focus on discussing, comparatively and jointly, midlevel and low level dissonant democracy in terms of their context within the
counterwaves, their durability and stability as well as their status as repeat offenders for
the crime of democratic failure.

Geography of Dissonant Democratic Failure
Dissonant democracies' failures, when considered collectively, have encompassed
a good portion of the globe in their scope. As can be seen in Figure 4, mid-level
democratic failure has impacted most of South America, as well as large portions of
Africa, Europe and the Middle East. South America, in particular, has been particularly
impacted by this form of democratic failure, as nearly the entire land mass has
experienced mid-level democratic failure at some point during the time under study. The
portions of the globe that have been insulated from this type of democratic failure have
largely done so because they have either remained autocratic, because they have
maintained high level democracies, or because they have instituted democracy after the
counterwaves and have thus largely escaped mid-level democratic failure.
12
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Figure 4. Mid-level democratic failures.

The broad geographical reach of mid-level democratic failure demonstrates 2
things. First of all, it shows the penetration of the democratic ideal in areas that were
previously dismissed as hostile to democracy, either due to cultural or economic
arguments, both of which abound. It also shows the historic vulnerability of democracy
in those regions, raising questions about regional ability to sustain democracy once it has
been instituted.
As can be seen in Figure 5, low level democratic failure was also a widespread
phenomenon in this study, although the geographical impact lighted in different places.
Some geographical similarity is shared with both types of dissonant democracy. The
western portion of South America has been impacted by both mid and low level

democratic failure, sharing this experience with France and certain portions of the Middle
East and Africa. However, low level democratic failure brings Asia into the melee, and
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Figure 5. Low level democratic failures.

area that had largely avoided the impact of mid-level democracy and thus escaped the
experience of mid-level democratic failure as well.

The Counterwave and Dissonant Democracies
A primary task is to examine dissonant democracy in light of the counterwaves.
To accomplish this, CW1 and CW2 will be examined comparatively, while also
comparing the failures of dissonant democracy that have taken place outside the confines
of the counterwaves. We will examine the way these democracies failed, the level to
which external takeovers played a role, the average polity drop experienced when
initially reaching failure threshold as well as when reaching the deepest point of failure.
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Recovery of democracy by those in the counterwaves will also be discussed to provide
points of comparison for the long-term toxicity of the counterwaves on dissonant
democracies. This discussion will fold both types of dissonant democracies, mid-level
and low level, into one, while discussing important differences as well.
General description
Some general description is in order when comparing the counterwaves, both to
each other and to the failures that occurred outside the counterwaves. For dissonant
democracies, 45% of all failures occurred within the counterwaves. This percentage,
while somewhat lower than the percentage of high level democracies that failed during
the counterwaves, is nonetheless significant, demonstrating the impact of dissonant
democracy's failure. It also points to the differences in the clustering of dissonant
democratic failure.
In terms of general numbers, low level democracy was the dominant form of
dissonant democracy until roughly 1960, when mid level democracy began a journey of
ascendance. Both types of dissonant democracy suffered dramatic decline during the
years of the second counterwave, but in the years following the CW2, when democracy
was again in resurgence, mid-level democracy experienced the more significant rise.
The rise and fall of the fortunes of dissonant democracy appears in even greater detail in
Graph 6, which shows low level democracy's initial dominance of dissonant democracy,
until the gap narrows in the 1950s and low level democracy emerges from the second
counterwave as very much the minor player.
We can also see dissonant democracy's relationship with the counterwave. Low
level democracy began a significant decline in the first counterwave, from which it has
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Graph 6. Dissonant democracy in the world system versus the average polity score.

never completely recovered. A player in the international system, especially from 18701930, by the end of the time studied, it represented a mere 5% share of the international
system, down from its peak influence of 21% at the onset of WWI.
Mid-level democracy has quite a different trajectory, again as shown in Graph 6.
Clearly the junior partner of dissonant democracy, it actually increased in share of the
world democracy market during the first part of the counterwave, even as low level
democracy continued its free-fall, before experiencing a sharp downturn in the latter
years of CW2. Its sharp rise, beginning in the late 1970s, tracks closely with mean
polity's recovery from CW2.

100
Reaching failure threshold
One of the constants across time and space as far as mid-level democratic failures
is the average time taken to reach failure threshold. Only 2 cases, Singapore and Syria,
took more than a year and both took place within the second counterwave. In spite of
these deviations, the average remains a year for those failure taking place inside the
counterwaves as well as those taking place outside. This is a significant finding. No
matter when the failures occurred, mid-level democracy has fallen rapidly. This is true in
spite of the variance in the ways in which democratic failure occurs. Whether by means
of a coup, a civil war, external takeover, or repression, the decrease in polity score has
taken a nosedive in short order. The bit by bit retraction of democratic freedoms has
been the historic exception not the rule. This, of course, furthers the conclusion reached
in the previous chapter, where it was shown that high level democracies declined rapidly.
While rapid decline is nearly universally true of mid-level democracies, we find
that more low level democracies have taken longer than a year to meet failure threshold.
Eight low level democracies took at least 2 years to fail, with Guyana meeting failure
threshold in 1980, 13 years after its initial decline. It seems somewhat counterintuitive
that those with more democratic institutions, namely mid-level and high level
democracies, fail quickly, while the most exceptions to this rule of rapid failure are found
within the set where democracy is most weakly expressed.
While failure threshold was reached, in most cases, quickly both inside and
outside the counterwaves, there are some comparative differences in the degree of
negative change experienced when that failure threshold was first reached, as shown in
Table 3 and Table 4.

101

Table 3. The mean change in polity for mic -level failures
TIME PERIOD
MEAN CHANGE
Counterwave 1
10.9
Counterwave 2
8.7
Outside counterwaves 8

Table 4. The mean change in polity for low level failures
TIME PERIOD
MEAN CHANGE
Counterwave 1
6.8
Counterwave 2
8.9
Outside counterwaves 5.7

For mid-level democracy the first counterwave featured a range of initial polity
drops from that ranged from a 3 point one year drop in Portugal (Portugal went on to
drop another 12 points subsequently) to a 16 point initial drop in Latvia. This gave the
first counterwave the distinction of a higher level of mean change in a one year time
frame, while the second counterwave and those failures occurring outside the
counterwaves have very similar mean polity changes in the first year that the failure
threshold is reached. We find the opposite for low level democracies. For them, the
second counterwave meant the steeper average initial polity drop. Of significance,
however, is that for both types of dissonant democratic failure the average initial change
in polity was steeper within the counterwaves than it was outside of them.
When one moves, however, to examining the average change in polity when the
peak failure is reached, for mid-level democratic failure the counterwaves emerge as
being quite similar, while remaining distinct from the failures that occur outside the
counterwaves. This phenomenon is illustrated in Table 5 and Table 6. Both
counterwaves feature deepening failures. Not only do they go deeper, they go deeper into
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the autocratic side by a drop of nearly 3 polity points, a drop that is the initial threshold
for failure. This is significant. There is a less significant deepening with low level
democratic failures. For the first counterwave, they average another 2 point drop, while
deepening only slightly for the second counterwave. Meanwhile, low level democratic
failures outside the counterwaves deepen the most dramatically. This is in keeping with
our finding that those democratic failures tend to occur over a longer time span.

Table 5. Average peak drop in polity for mid-level failures
TIME PERIOD
AVERAGE DROP
Counterwave 1
12.7
Counterwave 2
12.6
Outside counterwaves 9.8

Table 6. Average peak drop in polity for low level failures
TIME PERIOD
AVERAGE DROP
Counterwave 1
8.6
Counterwave 2
9.6
Outside counterwaves 8.1

Outcomes and recovery
Having taken a look at the average change in polity for dissonant democratic
failures, it is interesting to compare the counterwaves in terms of those that never recover
the level of democracy experienced before their failure.
For mid-level failures, as shown in Graph 7, the first counterwave is again quite
distinctive. Only one nation state didn't recover its peak level of democracy and that is a
special case scenario since the nation state, Czechoslovakia, went out of existence.
Czechoslovakia, as a unified entity, never regained the level of democracy that it had
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Graph 7. Dissonant democratic failures that don't recover democracy.

enjoyed before its 1939 demise, but the 2 separate countries of the Czech Republic and
Slovakia now both have surpassed their unified predecessor's level of democracy prior to
the failure in 1939. If most mid-level democratic failures from the first counterwave
regained, or surpassed, their initial peak levels of democracy, this directly contrasts with
the second counterwave. Of course, the second counterwave was more recent that the
first, so one is tempted to explain away this phenomenon simply as a matter of different
amounts of time that have elapsed. After all, mid-level democratic failures haven't had
the same number of years to recover their peak level of democracy as those that failed in
counterwave 1.
However, we see a stark contrast to low level democracies. While a higher
percentage of CW1 low democratic failures did not recover peak level of democracy, a
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scant 7% of CW2 low democratic failures don't recover peak democracy, in spite of the
fact that the second counterwave is more recent. While the difference between mid-level
and low level democratic failures in the first counterwave is slight, the difference
between these subsets in the second counterwave is dramatic. By way of comparison, it
is also interesting to note the difference in recovery rate of peak democracy between
those outside the counterwaves in mid-level and low level democratic failures. Twice as
many mid-level democracies fail to recover peak democracy by 2006 than low level
democracies. While we should be careful of pushing these numbers too far in anything
but comparison between the 2 groups,13 it is noteworthy that twice as many mid-level
democracies failed to recover peak level democracy as low level democracy failures.
What are the implications of these findings? On the one hand, it seems to
reinforce the distinctive nature of each counterwave. They impacted different segments
of democracy differently, with varying long term effects. One might easily postulate that
low level democracy has a higher recovery rate of peak level democracy precisely
because the bar is lower. Mid-level democracy, however, when it experiences failure has
a longer way to climb back. This is perfectly true, and yet is interesting in its own right.
It would seem, by this rationale, that previous experience with mid-level democracy does
not inherently predispose a return to the status quo ante of peak democracy level prior to
failure.
When looking at those who experienced democratic failure using the slightly
more lenient lens of looking at their recovery of any level of democracy, that is a polity
score of one or higher, we find that there are still nearly 30% of mid-level failures that
13
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never edge back into any form of democracy by 2006, in direct contrast to the first
counterwave. For low level democratic failure, we find very low percentages of low
level democracies with no recovery of democracy.
This leads us to look at the average recovery time for both peak democracy, and
any level of democracy for dissonant democracies that have experienced both failure and
recovery. As has already been discussed, there is very little difference in mid-level and
low level democracy when it comes to recovery of peak democracy and recovery of any
level of democracy. Those who recovered democracy, tended to do so dramatically, not
gradually.
The time span for recovery is remarkably similar, as can be seen in Graph 8. It is
interesting to note that the 14 cases of dissonant democratic failure that took place outside
the counterwave were able to recover some level of democracy in only 11 years, while it
took an average of 36 years for the members of the first counterwave to do the same. The
clustering of the recoveries points to some important differences in the world system that
have taken place across time in regards to the fostering of the democratic ideal. The
counterwaves have been impacted by the waves of democracy, suggesting a relationship
that would bear future investigation. Democratic failure did not subsist at low levels
sporadically across time, but was clustered in counterwaves. Similarly, recovery of
democracy happened at the same time that democracy was first adopted by nations for the
first time. This suggests a collective rise and fall of the democratic ideal that argues
strongly for an international component for both democratic failure and democratic
success, as is shown in this case by the recovery pattern of dissonant democracy.
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Graph 8. Dissonant democracy's recovery of peak democracy versus any democracy.

Distinct mechanisms of failure
How do dissonant democracies fail? There are 4 basic options. Dissonant
democracy fails, most frequently, via coups as shown by Graph 9 and Graph 10. The
second biggest culprit is repression by the government, as it takes away democratic
governance. A third, but less prevalent, option is takeover by an external force. Fourth, a
country can devolve into civil war, in a way that renders democratic governance
impossible as factions resort to bullets not ballots in their quest for power. While the
mechanism of failure should not be equated with a causal pathway, it does provide
insight into democracy's vulnerability.
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While coups represent the most common mechanism for undermining dissonant
democracy, the extent to which this mechanism was used in the second counterwave,
especially in mid-level democratic failures, points to some important distinctions for that
time of history. In looking again at Graph 9 and Graph 10, it is evident that external
takeovers are not a dominant mechanism of failure for dissonant democracy. This
mechanism has its largest role in the first counterwave with mid-level democracies, while
repression has its highest showing in the first counterwave for low level democratic
failures. Revisiting the historical context bring some of these distinctive into broader
relief.
The first counterwave occurred in the build up to World War II, the competing
ideologies of fascism and communism exerted powerful antidemocratic force across the
international system. Democracy seemed a dangerous undertaking, in many countries
because it was feared a malleable tool for communism. During this time, as well, the
realities of modernity and emerging nationalisms had great impact.
The second counterwave is inextricably linked with decolonization. In the
aftermath of colonialism, identities that had been tacked on to unify nations under
colonial rule disappeared. Traditions, oftentimes those that had been overtly oppressed,
re-emerged as the question of identity again emerged. In the 1800s many were forced
into the imposed identity of nationalism. After World War II, the imposition
disintegrated. The remnants of the colonizers institutions were there, and were often
times quite attractive, but the desire to own the government for oneself was there on the
part of the national governments. What arose was a lack of consensus. The colonizers
had cobbled together people who oftentimes had no shared identity. These cobbled

together pieces of nations had much work to do after gaining their independence.. .and
the lack of consensus often led to the threat of anarchy, as the constructed nation states
seemed to ready to break apart.
In other cases, the threat of anarchy brought about military intervention. While in
a democracy the voters and the legislative branch of government are responsible for
problem-solving in times of crisis, in these dissonant democracies the consensus was
simply not there. This lack of consensus is a real difficulty for emerging democracies.
The inability to build consensus multiplies the difficulty of the scenarios and situations.
In the absence of this consensus, military "caretakers" often stepped in to provide a
paternalistic guardianship of the nation state as a whole, purportedly creating the space in
which democracy could breathe and grow. There are multiple difficulties with this
mentality, but chief among them is that democracy can then get no practice at problem
solving when the going gets really tough. Democracy, then, remains viable in the calm,
but not in the storm. When economic downturns loom on the horizon, the military steps
in. When social disorder threatens the fabric of the society, the military steps in.
Democracy remains a child in the background who can only come out to play in sunny
weather, with no chance to face stormy weather.
It is no coincidence that dissonant democracies face the most challenges as far as
crisis management is concerned.14 The challenges faced in the multiple arenas of
economic difficulty, national identity, factionalized political processes, need advanced
help.. .but the countries that experience these challenges are the very ones that don't have
the means to deal with them. And so, they vacillate back and forth, dabbling in
14

William Case, "Can the "Halfway House" Stand? Semidemocracy and Elite Theory in Three Southeast
Asian Countries," Comparative Politics 28, no. 4 (July 1996): 437-464.
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democracy and then switching to authoritarianism, but never experiencing the stability
that is so needed to get them through to the other side.

The Durability and Stability of Dissonant Democracy
There is a difference between stability and durability. Stability references the
status quo, a lack of change. For the purposes of this study, durability looks at length of
time spent within a category of democracy and is thus slightly more variable, since it
accepts some vacillation within a narrow range. Of course, these 2 concepts are linked.
When we mention one we think of the other, but this distinction remains an important one
to keep in mind as we look at the durability of dissonant democracy.
Durability of dissonant democracy
As is the case in several of the other categories, there are some important
differences in the durability of low level and mid-level democracies. For both types of
dissonant democracy, I examined those that had a duration of 15 years or longer.
For low level democracy, 27 nations experienced low level democracy for 15
years or longer. The longest running low level democracy was nineteenth century Korea,
which existed as a low level democracy for 110 years until annexed by Japan in 1910. In
this case, the independence of the yangban class as it interacted with a comparatively
weak and constrained emperor, ensured the viability of this system for years.
While the Korean case is rather unique, other nations also experienced low level
democracy for significant periods of time, in a range of 16 to 79 years. Why, then, does
15

For a complete description of the interactions between the emperor and the yangban class see Hyegyong,
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low level democracy have such a reputation for a lack of longevity? Well, of the 27
nations that experienced durability as low level democracies, only 3 had start years after
1945. In fact, of all the long running low level democracies, only one is extant today.16
Of the rest of the durable low level democracies, 17 had their start dates in the 1800s. In
fact, when looking at the durability of low level democracies, it is clear to see that low
level democracy was much more viable before 1950 than it was after.
This is further evidence of the changing power of the democratic ideal. It is no
longer enough to subsist at low level democracy. In fact low level democracy in recent
years may know just enough to be dangerous. Like an ill-fated character, low level
democracy knows enough to identify itself as liberating or somewhat democratic, but not
enough to help it escape its situation. It may indeed suffer from raising expectations
while failing to deliver.
Do the durable mid-level democracies follow the same track as low level ones? Is
this kind of dissonant democracy also a remnant of the 1800s that no longer exists in any
great force today? When making the jump up to mid-level democracy, we find more to
contrast than to compare with low level democracy. They share similarities in incidence
(102 incidences of low level democracy across time as compared to 117 incidences of
mid-level democracy across time), and nearly the same number have endured for 15 years
or more (27 low level democracies and 25 mid-level democracies). But here the
similarities end. This is particularly true when comparing the subset of durable low and
mid-level democracies.
16

This case is Malaysia, with its start year of 1969. Malaysia started as a level lOdemocracy following
independence, and has managed to hang on to at least a low level of democracy "against all odds" so to
speak. This may have quite a bit to do with its highly institutionalized democratic framework at
independence.
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While durable low level democracy belongs largely to the confines of the 1800s
and early 1900s, durable mid-level democracy occurs more predominantly after 1945. In
fact, while only 1 durable low level democracy was still extant at the end of the time
under study, 8 of the 25 durable mid level democracies still existed in 2006. Mid-level
democracy, along with high level democracy, has increased as a percentage of the
international system, while low level democracy was almost extinct in 2006.
Downward mobility within the broader context
When talking about stability within a polity we really are most concerned with
negative change. And, of course, it is more alarming (and less stable), when these
negative changes are extreme. Are we really alarmed when an autocracy or lower level
democracy precipitously changes into a high level democracy? No. Our only real
concern when this occurs is whether an adequate foundation exists on which to build to
prevent an equally wild downward swing.
What is the pathway for dissonant democratic failures, as situated within the
broader context of dissonant democracy? To get at this question, let's look at the
outcomes for mid-level and low level democracies. Falsely creating 2006 as the "end of
history" allows us to get some idea of dissonant democracy's function in the international
system, especially in comparison with high level democracy. Is low level democracy
mainly a bridge to high level democracy? Is it a playground for liberating autocracies
that then sink back into old habits? Or, perhaps we can think of dissonant democracy as a
sort of institutional learning center, where nation states enter the doors, before retreating
back into autocracy, but will debut at a higher level if they attempt democracy again?
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Of the nation states that have experienced low level democracy at some point
within the time frame of this study (1800-2006), 31 have risen out of low level
democracy to at least a temporarily higher state, while 61 have fallen back down into
autocracy from low level democracy. Two nations went out of existence from low level
democracy (Orange Free State and the United Provinces) and 8 nation states were low
level democracies as of 2006. So, of the 102 nation states that have been, at least at some
point, low level democracies, 60% have decreased into autocracy.
What about the next tier of dissonant democracies? How do mid-level
democracies fare across time? One of the clearest divergences is in the fact that 32 nation
states still exist as mid-level democracies, compared to only 8 of the low level
democracies which can make this boast. This is of particular interest, since the 2
categories have similar numbers of constituents (102 for low level democracy and 117 for
mid-level democracy). As far as splitting those that have decreased in polity, 44% have
experienced negative change while roughly 30% have experienced positive change. The
remaining 27% are those nation states that remained mid-level democracies in 2006.
Having looked at the durability for dissonant democracy, the time has come to
compare this category with high level democracy. Since there is no higher category, no
one can move up, but what happens to those who exist in this highest strata? This
category of democracy had the most constituents of any type of democracy at the end of
2006, with 71 constituent nation states. There are 121 nation states that have experienced
high level democracy at some point in the course of the study. Of these 121 political
entities, 48 experienced enough of a downward swing as to no longer be a high level
democracy. In addition, 2 states went out of existence, West Germany and
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Czechoslovakia. We might say, however, that they've balanced each other out since
West Germany assimilated the East Germans into high level democracy and both
constituent nations of the former Czechoslovakia also exist as high level democracies.
High level democracy, then, has proven the most durable of the types of democracy. This
leaves us with further questions about dissonant democracy as a transitory state.
In order to more fully explore the question of dissonant democracy as a transitory
state, we can work backward from those who have achieved high level democracy, to see
what function the lower levels played in their journeys. Of the 71 nation states that were
high level democracies at the end of this study's timeline in 2006, 42 had been high level
democracies for at least 15 years. In one sense, requiring these democracies to be present
in 2006 is a rather low bar, since, as we have seen, high level democracy is the most
prevalent form of democracy in 2006. In another sense, however, it seems only fair to
compare the democratization trajectories of these current, high level democracies with
durations of at least 15 years, with the trajectories of high level democratic failures.
There are several basic trajectories of "modern" persistent high level democracies,
namely those that meet the requirement above. Their transition patterns were not at all
what one might anticipate based on the transition literature.17 One might expect that
nation states start out as autocracies, make some reforms, proceed to low level
democracy, make some reforms, proceed to mid-level democracy, make some reforms,
and then finally arrive at high level democracy, via a nice and stable process of gradual
reform. In the entire dataset of those high level democracies that are both extant in 2006,
and have been high level democracies for at least 15 years, only 2 nation states took this
17

W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1960).
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route. Only Costa Rica and the United Kingdom started off as autocracies, then moved to
low level democracy, before passing on to mid-level, and finally high level democracy.
The rest fall into 3 basic categories, which each deviate quite substantially from
this expected outcome. In one group, we have the subset of somewhat gradual transition.
In order to belong to this category, the nation state must have been either a mid-level or
low level democracy for at least one year before transitioning to high level democracy.
Of the 42 nations studied, 14 (including Costa Rica and the UK) meet this requirement,
with 5 nations spending time as low level democracies prior to their transition and 7
nations spending time as mid-level democracies prior to their transition. The majority,
however, fall outside this category. These nations either debut as high level democracies
(the case for 7 of them), or transition to high level democracy directly from autocracy.
Interestingly, autocracy is a more likely springboard for high level democracy than either
low level democracy or mid-level democracy or even than both types of dissonant
democracy combined. What might our conclusions imply for those nation states that are
currently either mid-level or low level democracies?
Before we jump to the conclusion that dissonant democracies are bereft of value,
let us look at the role they have played in democracies that have failed more than once.
In doing so, perhaps we will discover a constructive purpose, not only for dissonant
democracy, but also for the role of democratic failure.

Repeat Offenders
One indicator of instability is the issue of repeat offenders, those nation states that
have experienced democratic failure more than one time. This indicates both a repeated

116
attempt to try democracy once it has failed, and a repeat failure of democracy the second
time. One question that might arise is to distinguish between outcomes for those who
failed only once and the repeat offenders. Let's take a couple minutes to look at this
issue. The results for those nations that did not repeat democratic failure are quite mixed.
A majority of the countries did not repeat democratic failure because they never
recovered any form of democracy. For those that did recover democracy, Albania and
Armenia recovered mid-level democracy but did not manage progress to high level
democracy. That leaves only 3 success stories: Brazil, Germany and Latvia.
The vast majority of nations in this study failed at least twice, whether as a midlevel democracy, a low level democracy, a high level democracy or one of each. In
addition, several of these nations experienced a deepening in autocracy during their
history before they ever instituted democracy. This means that their polity score
worsened by at least a 3 point drop at some point as an autocracy. It is interesting to note
that the nations that experienced deepening autocracy often went on to experience
democratic failure, a subject that will be examined in greater detail in the following
chapter.
Dissonant democratic failure has a very high percentage of repeat offenders, as
shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7. Of the entire subset of low level democracies, those
experiencing only one failure comprise 35% of the entire data set. If we look into this
further, we see that 8 of those that only experience 1 failure fall into autocracy, but don't
re-emerge from it, so democratic failure is obviously not an option for them.
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Figure 6. Mid-level democratic failures by number of times failed.

Figure 7. Low level democratic failures by number of times failed.
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That leaves us with only 19% that experience democratic failure only once. For
the entire dataset, including these who fail only once, the mean number of failures is
2.21.

Conclusion
Dissonant democracy, in many ways, continues the discovery process started in
the previous chapter. Like high level democratic failures, mid-level and low level
democracies are disproportionately represented within the counterwave time bands.
Dissonant democracy also tends to fail quickly.
Dissonant democratic failure also further illuminates the distinctions between the
2 counterwave phenomena. These lower levels of democracy figured more prominently
in the second downturn than in the first. Dissonant democracies also feature many repeat
offenders, demonstrating the impact of mid-level and low level democracy on both
durability and stability. It now remains to study the deepening of autocracy, to see
whether democratic failure also shares commonalities with the worsening of autocratic
rule.
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CHAPTER VI
AUTOCRATIC DEEPENING

In 1973 Juan Linz published a book entitled Totalitarian and Authoritarian
Regimes. At the time, it seemed clear that this topic was one of importance since "at least
half of humanity" lived under the influence of non-democracy.

Whether totalitarian,

authoritarian or sultanistic, all of the regimes included in the Linz study easily qualified
as nondemocracies. During the time, studying autocracy seemed a good bread and butter
undertaking for a scholar, an endeavor with strong possibilities for a steady stream of
future publications. Linz used the following quote by Robert Dahl to summarize
scholars' expectations for change in the coming decades: "As with a great many things,
the safest bet about a country's regime a generation from now is that it will be somewhat
different but not radically different from what it is today."2 The expectation was for a
continuation of the same. In this case, the strength of non-democracy seemed sure, while
the advance of democracy was not to be contemplated. One could equate the perceived
likelihood of democratic advance to a swift conclusion to conflict in the midst of trench
warfare.
Although non-democracy seemed completely "dug in" in 1973, a scant 3 years
hence the third wave of democratization launched from the Iberian Peninsula, and
dramatically changed the landscape of polities. In the updated introduction to the 2000
edition of his book, Linz admits "I certainly was wrong in my pessimism about the
1

Juan Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
2000), 56.
2
Ibid., 269.
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possibility of peaceful, orderly, even formally constitutional transition from
nondemocratic regimes to democracy."3
Given this seismic shift, then, should we study autocracies? Isn't this particularly
incongruent in a study on democratic failure? Autocracies, by definition, exclude the
possibility of democratic failure. At first glance, a chapter on autocracy seems an
unwelcome stranger in a study of democratic failure.
One justification for its inclusion is the literature on the legacy of an autocratic
history on the quality of democracy post-transition. This view argues that autocracies
leave an indelible stamp.
Lingering authoritarian legacies—even when they cannot per se cause
authoritarian backlash—nevertheless present a long-term problem for the
quality and consistency of postauthoritarian democratic regimes, both at
the macrolevel of political and economic institutions' operations and at the
microlevel of citizens' perceptions of democracy.
Adding to this literature is a separate one tying centralized autocracy to state
collapse. By this reasoning, the nation state's unique projection of power into every
aspect of civilian life, replacing the institutions of civil society, makes it more fragile in
its rigidity. When it fails, the state falls apart completely.5 Failed states, particularly in
the post 9/11 atmosphere, garner enough attention to merit further study of autocracy.
In addition to these arguments for the importance of studying autocracy is the
knowledge that while autocracies can't be democratic failures, they can deepen. This
chapter takes a look at the deepening of autocracy, and relates it to our study of
3
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Figure 8. Nations experiencing autocratic deepening.

democratic failure. After all, autocracy was the predominant form of governance
globally, although in varying concentrations, for the first 100 years of the time under
study. What we have done thus far for democracy, looking at the various levels of
democracy and examining democratic failure in light of these considerations, we will
now do for autocracy. Constraints on space necessitate brevity so our focus primarily
rests on describing autocracy and how it has changed and evolved over the time under
study, the status of autocracy as it existed in the counterwave time period, and, finally,
the durability and stability of autocracy. Each of these sections, additionally, offers the
ability to compare and contrast the state of autocracy with the state of democracy that has
already been discussed. After all, as we can see from Figure 8, autocratic deepening has
been just as global a phenomenon as democratic failure, and has also been toxic to the
democratic ideal.

Perfect Autocracies
What do the institutions of a nation with a -10 score look like? "In mature form,
autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation. Their chief
executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite, and
once in office they exercise power with few institutional constraints."7 Thus, mature
democracies and mature autocracies are diametrically opposed.
When I look at autocracy, here's the logic to which I easily tend. Democracy is
good. A level 10 democracy is the most well-consolidated democracy. Therefore, a
level 10 is the best government. Autocracy is bad. A -10 is the most well-consolidated
autocracy. Therefore, a -10 is the worst government.
Given this mindset, when I look at Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Soviet Union or
even at Kim's North Korea I expect to see perfect -10 regimes.. .after all, aren't these
good historic examples of complete autocracy? And yet all these regimes missed the
"perfect autocracy" designation by a point weighing in at -9. Polity doesn't code these as
perfect autocracies, because while authority has been vested in one person, that one
person was supported by an elite group, usually well-organized within a party structure.
In fact, it is interesting to note that the regimes most often thought of as completely
totalitarian, the perpetrators of some of the most stunning crimes against humanity, have
what we might call "managed" autocracy. The fact that the bloodiest, most ruthless
despots of the twentieth century in fact used a party structure to disperse their cruelty
merely reinforces the power that underlies institutionalized government. The
organizational advances that facilitate democratic governance of the nation state brings
7
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structure and efficiency to governmental rule can be used to structure tax programs, or to
structure the dissemination of Jews to death camps.8
Polity doesn't measure evil. Polity does measure institutionalized value structures
as related to the concentration of power. In democracies, there are more hands in the
power pie. This is not to say the nation state itself is less powerful. In fact, the reach of
the state in mature democracies is often quite extensive (directing and controlling large
sectors of the economy and society), but the power institutions themselves have more
voices and these voices compete before a constituency. In complete autocracies, the
voice more closely approximates a monotone.
To give us a better idea of the scope encompassed by autocracy, let's look at some
of the generalities. As seen in Graph 11, while no nation entered the dataset in 1800 as a
perfect democracy, twelve nation states entered the data set as perfect autocracies. The
1800s saw the birth of 7 additional perfect autocracies between the years of 1806-1816,
but all 7 of these nations went out of existence well before 1900. The 1900s birthed 18
more perfect autocracies.
While 12 nations entered the data set as perfect autocracies, only 2 perfect
autocracies, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, remained in 2006. Perfect autocracy is rarer at the
end of the dataset than it was at the beginning. In some sense, we might consider the fate
of these perfect autocracies as an ideal testing ground for the varying penetration and
power of the democratic ideal. Table 7 shows the varying 2006 outcomes for those
nation states that have at one time or another experienced ideal autocracies. While this is
clearly a mixed bag, but it is interesting to note that only 34% of those who have
8
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Graph 11. Number of perfect autocracies, 1800-2006.

experienced perfect autocracy remain at any level of autocracy in 2006. This certainly
reflects a broad shift away from antidemocratic ideals.

Table 7. Outcomes for perfec t autocracies as of 2006
HIDEM MIDEM LODEM LOAUT MIDAUT HIAUT
Austria
Denmark
Bulgaria
Japan
Portugal
Spain
Sweden

Haiti
Russia
Turkey

Jordan

Bahrain
Iran
Kuwait
Nepal
Thailand

Bhutan
Oman
Qatar
Saudi
Arabia
Swaziland

OCCUPIED

GONE

Afghanistan

Bavaria
Modena
Parma
Prussia
Sardinia
Saxony
Tuscany
Two
Sicilies
Yemen
North
Yugoslavia
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But what of the rest of the scope of autocracy? If democracy in 2006 can
encompass such disparate nations as Canada and Cambodia, Spain and Sierra Leone, it
might serve us well to examine the varying levels of autocracy. We've already looked at
"perfect" autocracy, but what does autocracy look like across the range from -10 to 0?
What do the various levels of autocracy look like?

General Considerations
There is a great temptation, still present today, to view autocracy in a monolithic
way. This temptation is particularly strong in macro studies which, like this one, lump.
Lumping studies look at big picture trends, while ignoring some of the finer grain
distinctions. These macro observations bring both reward and peril, and have sometimes
been rightly critiqued for simply muddying the water, instead of bringing clarity.
To combat this, finer grain distinctions are in order, even when they are
necessarily still broad in scope. Linz in his seminal work on autocratic regimes, created
broad typologies based on his perception of regime characteristics. This is entirely
plausible and beneficial. Totalitarian regimes differ from authoritarian ones by the extent
to which they "completely organize political life and society" often while using terror and
ideology as weapons of choice.9 In turn, sultanistic regimes, those non-democratic
regimes that root their legitimacy in traditional monarchy, are also distinct. And, both of
these entities are different from Linz's definition of an authoritarian regime, which still
maintains a distinction between the government and society.10
9

Juan Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
2000), 4.
10
Ibid., 10.

Since the focus of this study is on institutionalized power structures, I have
chosen different distinctions, based on the presence and absence of institutional
characteristics, as evidenced in the polity scores. In the division of the polity scale, those
nation states with a polity score of 0 to -10 qualify as autocracies. Within this category,
however, are 3 subcategories. As with democracies, the categories are: low level
autocracy (0 to -3), mid level autocracy (-4 to -7), and high level autocracy (-8 to -10).
Creating the same categories for autocracy that we have created for democracy
helps to determine if there are certain thresholds for an autocracy's durability and
stability. While it would be unwieldy to discuss all the autocracies that have existed
across the data set, looking at a couple examples provides a mooring.
Without surprise, Singapore is classified as a low level autocracy. Defying all
who link a high standard of living inextricably with high level democracy, the prosperous
autocrats of this city-state have maintained the status quo as a low level autocracy ever
since the move away from mid-level democracy in 1965. The country of Jordan is
another contemporary example of a low level autocracy. The voice of moderation in a
rather prickly neighborhood, Jordan has moderated the higher levels of autocracy of past
years and now keeps autocracy to a fairly low thrum.
Mid-level autocracy is another slice. From 1952-2004, Egypt was a mid-level
autocracy, although it has since moderated to a low level one for the final 2 years under
study. Cuba, too, is an example of a mid-level autocracy. In the years that immediately
followed the revolution, it was a high level autocracy, but by 1961 it had settled into a
durable mid-level autocratic state.
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High level autocracy is the last subdivision of autocracy. Perfect autocracy has
already been discussed. The other members of this group are those nation states score -8
or -9. Stalin's Russia, and Hitler's Germany have already been mentioned as members of
the high autocracy club. Vichy France and Mussolini's Italy also qualify. In 2006, 9
nations made up this diminishing group.11 Five of these nations have been high level
autocracies since inception, and 2 have always been -10 autocracies. These regimes,
whether sultanistic, highly authoritarian or totalitarian, all share similar institutional
power structures.
Just as democracies have fluctuated between different kinds of democracy,
autocracies fluctuate between the varying levels of autocracy. This variance will be
discussed in greater detail in the section of autocracy's durability, but I wanted to
mention it here to guard against the idea of a monolithic, static "state of being" type of
mindset. The subdivisions between the varying types of autocracy are helpful, but they
are also fluid.
One of the goals of the study is to look at the varying levels of autocracy to
discover the ways autocracy has changed across time in relation to democracy. Before
looking the evidence as gathered, let's talk about some reasonable scenarios. First of all,
autocracy could retreat when democracy is on the march. In the same way, we might
expect that when autocracy is on the march, democracy retreats in a "tit for tat" scenario.
Another scenario we might call polarization. When democracies get more democratic,
autocracies in turn get more autocratic. Or, in a third scenario, there might be no
discernible relationship between democracy and autocracy. They may just coexist with
11

These nations are: Bhutan, North Korea, Myanmar (Burma), Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Swaziland,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

no relationship at all. These are 3 options to keep in mind as we explore autocratic
deepening, and possible relationships with democracy and democratic failure.
Autocracy as ideology
While democracy has a clear ideological component, the case of linking ideology
and autocracy is at times a bit murky. This is due, in part, to the broader variation in
arrangements of governance that live under the autocratic canopy. Present in autocracy's
tent is communism, fascism, totalitarianism, sultanism, military dictatorship and even
other subtypes. The ideology behind autocracy has a much broader field to cover, as we
can see from this list. Perhaps this is the reason autocracy is sometimes viewed as less
ideological in nature.
Instead of being less ideological in nature, autocracy simply has a more varied
ideological background. For the purposes of this study, the 2 main variants have been
communism and fascism. These 2 systems of government have been diametrically
opposed to democracy, offering alternate visions of how to govern wisely and in the
name of the people, while not advocating specific governance for the people. Both of
these systems have exhibited extreme fervor in their ideological components. Karl
Loewenstein, writing in 1935, aptly described the messianic fervor of both systems of
thought:
We are therefore on safe ground in assuming that modern dictatorships of
fascist or communist tinge are not only articles for home consumption but
religious, which, like all great spiritual movements of history, aspire to
transform the whole world gradually into one realm of autocratic rule;
while the suppression of democracy by autocracy will be but a means of
the transformation of the spiritual, political, and economic system of the
globe.12
12
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Both systems of thought provided answers to the problems facing countries under
more democratic governance. In cases where the distribution of wealth was stilted away
from workers and toward owners communism offered a strongly ideological answer to
this thorny problem.
The Soviet Union became the consummate example of union of communism and
the state. As Robert Wesson has stated, writing at a time when the Soviet Union was still
in existence:
No society can be understood without reference to the image it draws of
itself and its purposes; and this is emphatically true of the Soviet Union,
which has forcefully and with extraordinary persistence asserted its
ideological foundations and based its legitimacy upon a canon.13
Of interesting note, when the Soviet Union crumbled, the ideology was defeated as well.
This brings up an interesting point about the intersection of ideology and the legitimacy
of a state as intertwined self-reinforcing mechanisms. When the ideology of the Soviet
Union was challenged, the system crumbled as the legitimacy for rule no longer existed.
Thoroughly discredited as an ideology, the remaining "communists" in the world are
decidedly less committed to the foundational tenets of communism, namely a rejection of
capitalism. It is easy to write communism off as a system of autocracy that is dead. This
presumes, however, that it will never again rise. This is wrong-headed. Democracy will
always face the challenge of balancing the equitable distribution of wealth with liberty
and freedom. If she should fail to manage this balancing act, as she has failed in the past,
I am willing to wager that some reincarnation of a tempered communist ideal will again
surface.

13

Robert Wesson, "The Soviet State, Ideology, and Patterns of Autocracy," Soviet Studies 20, no. 2
(October 1968): 179.
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If it is broadly accepted that communism is ideological in nature, fascism's
ideology is less clearly delineated. In contrast to democracy, fascism and communism
are both "systems on which the survival of the individuals is guaranteed by the state."14
Sharing several characteristics of rule in common with communism, for example the cult
of personality of the state leader, the state's interference with the economy, and the
inherent paternalism of the state leader as protector of the people, some have argued there
is really little functional difference between communism and fascism.
While this may be true in practice, the underlying justification of rule is different.
I readily acknowledge that fascism, unlike communism and even democracy, "does not
rest on formal philosophical positions with claims to universal validity." 5 Fascism uses
ideas differently, and has retained validity beyond communism for precisely these
reasons. As Robert Paxton has noted:
There was no "Fascist Manifesto," no founding fascist thinker. Although
one can deduce from fascist language implicit Social Darwinist
assumptions about human nature, the need for community and authority in
human society, and the destiny of nations in history, fascism does not base
its claims to validity on their truth.
Precisely because of this, fascist ideas have proven more long-lasting than their
communist counterparts. Military dictatorships, sultanistic regimes, and other
nationalistic regimes the world over find their roots here. Fascism is such a powerful
ideology precisely because it is so fluid. There are no inconvertible truths that must be
tended in order for legitimacy to reign. The underlying ideology for fascism lies in the
14

Alexander Krisztics, "Essential Principles of Socialism, Fascism, and Democracy," Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 180 (July 1935): 133.
15
Robert O. Paxton, "The Five Stages of Fascism," The Journal of Modern History 70, no. 1 (March 1998):
4.
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fundamental assumption that governmental leadership is better equipped to make
decisions for the nation than the people themselves.
Democracy is particularly vulnerable following systemic disturbances. The lead
up to and aftermath of World War I, birthed fascism and nurtured communism, 2
ideologies that are fundamentally opposed to the democratic ideal. Fascism, in particular,
was birthed "not during a period of overriding growth but during one of prevailing
economic vicissitudes."17

The future is veiled, but the lessons of the ascendance of

autocratic ideology prove useful if democracy is to prevail.

Democracy's Never Never Land
In 2006, there were 29 extant nations born as autocracies that have never
transitioned. These never democracies consist of 5 that have always been high level
autocracies, 2 of them having always been perfect autocracies. There are an additional 17
nation states that went out of existence that had never experienced democratic transition.
Of the nations that no longer exist, most were incorporated into nation states that are
currently high level democracies, with Vietnam and Yemen as the notable exceptions.
Why should we be concerned about nations that have never experienced
democracy? Certainly the areas that have never experienced democracy are quite
instructive as to their resilience against the spread of democracy. In this sense, they
represent a real challenge to the democratic ideal. Figure 9 shows the stretch of these
never democracies. Scholars have noted the democratic ideal has not been imported by
17

Charles S. Maier, "Some Recent Studies of Fascism," The Journal of Modern History 48, no.3
(September 1976): 521.
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neverDem
• 0 • 1
Figure 9. Nations never experiencing democracy.

some nation states, and even by some geographic regions. The focus has largely been on
Islam's resistance to democracy's forward march, the map above demonstrates its lack of
penetration in other locales as well. Not only has antidemocracy flourished in the Middle
East, it has continued sustenance in Africa and Asia as well.

Autocratic Deepening
While as a whole, autocracy experienced a decline from the height of its
influence in 1825, both counterwaves offered times of resurgence as democracies crossed
over into autocratic territory. The relationship between autocratic deepening and the
counterwaves is evident in Graph 12. This trend is most clearly visible in the second
counterwave, as our previous discussions would lead us to expect. The first counterwave
was populated, in part, by high level democracies that were conquered by Hitler. While
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Graph 12. Mean polity score versus autocratic deepening.

this clearly counted as a democratic failure, the external rule was not consolidated into
autocratic institutions, as so counts as an interruption, a code that is not factored into the
autocracy or democracy scores.
While failing democracies clearly account for a portion of autocracies' advance
during the counterwave years, there is also a relationship between the counterwaves and
autocratic deepening. Autocracies sporadically experienced deepening in the 1850-1880
time band, but experienced a strong peak during both counterwaves as can be seen in

Graph 13, where the rise of all types of autocracy is evident in CW1 (1922-1940) and in
CW2 (1957-1977).
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In contrast to the first counterwave, however, the second one fed mid level
autocracy most vigorously, a trend that decreased at the onset of the third wave of
democracy. Toward the end of the time period studied, we see a general amelioration of
autocracy, as low level autocracy is on the rise while mid-level and high level autocracy
are both in decline.
This relationship between autocratic deepening, democracy's advance and the
counterwaves is even more compelling when looking at the average polity score in
comparison with autocracy and democracy as percentages of the international system, as
shown in Graph 14. The percentage of democracy in the system tracks to a stunning
degree with the mean polity score, underlining the role of democracy's rise and fall as
contributing to shifts in the mean polity score. We can see that, as expected, autocracy
roughly rises in step with the counterwaves as well, even when considered as a whole.
Furthering our examination of the relationship between autocratic deepening,
democratic failures and the counterwaves, we see the consistent pattern of autocratic
deepening preceding democratic failure. In other words, autocracies get worse before
democracies fail. This relationship, shown in Graph 15, strengthens the argument that the
study of autocratic deepenings has important implications for democratic failure. More
research needs to be done in this area to determine the exact nature of the relationship,
but autocratic deepening has clearly served as a bellwether for democratic failure in both
of the counterwaves.
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Autocracy and Durability
Among contemporary scholars who study democracy, and in particular
democratic transitions, it has become increasingly unpopular to extol any virtues of
autocracy. However, if any remnant of respect for autocratic institutions remains, it is in
the arena of stability. Autocracies, if little else in today's parlance, still retain relevance
as stabilizers of society. When democracy gets messy and factionalized or grinds to a
halt because of the inability to form consensus, autocracy steps in with cool assurance
and cools, or extinguishes, flaring tempers and contention. In other words, autocracy
knows how to do stability.
18

Henry Bienen and Nicolas van de Walle, "A Proportional Hazard Model of Leadership Duration," The
Journal of Politics 54, no. 3 (August 1992): 685-717.

The durability and stability of autocracies are 2 different things. First of all, we
have durability. A polity can be safely understood as being an autocracy when it has a
polity score of-10 to 0. However, we often times see "interruptions" in the autocratic
rule, just as we have interruptions in democratic rule. These interruptions come in a
variety of forms, as has already been discussed, but they all interrupt regularized rule. In
no sense can we look at these interruptions as a transition to democracy. Neither,
however, can we say that organized autocratic rule is in place. It is in this sense that
duration and stability are separate and important concepts that help us flesh out these
differences. In many cases where autocracy "ends" it transitions to one of the
interruption states. While we can't refer to this as a continuance of autocracy, we can
refer to this as a continuance of non-democracy. The bigger issue, of course, is that of
stability. Non-democracy and autocracy have slightly different durations, but a transition
from autocracy to one of these interruption states reflects a lack of stability. Nondemocracy is durable in certain time periods of this study, but what is its stability? In
other words, how often is the state of autocracy interrupted? Looking at the number of
interruptions experienced in Graph 16 and how they have contributed to autocracy's lack
of durability, helps us to understand that autocracy is not the monolithic state of being
that is often assumed. There are shades to autocracy just as there are shades to
democracy. Some of these interruptions resulted in lesser autocracy, some of the
interruptions resulted in deepened autocracy and many resulted in a continuity of the
autocracy experienced before the interruption occurred.
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Graph 16. Interruptions in democracy and autocracy.

Repeat offenders for autocratic deepening
At this point, it might serve as a good reminder to review the fact that in the larger
polity dataset, there are 3 basic options: autocracy, democracy, and interruption. Some
nations within the dataset started out as democracies and remained democracies for the
length of the study. So too, some began as autocracies and remained autocracies for the
length of the study. The vast majority experienced swings, both within democracy and
autocracy and between the 2, often times also passing through "interruptions."
We've already discussed repeat offenders in democratic failure. Now, we will do
the same for autocracy. Our discussion serves 2 purposes. First, it continues to form our

ideas about autocracy's stability and durability. Second, it offers points of comparison
with democratic failure.
For the autocracies, the following nation states experience repeated autocratic
deepening: Bolivia, Bulgaria, El Salvador, Hungary, Mexico, Paraguay, Romania,
Thailand and Turkey. Bolivia experienced a total of 4 episodes of autocratic deepening,
while El Salvador had 3. The rest of the nations had 2 bouts of autocratic deepening.
We might take a couple moments to note a few things about those nations that
experienced more than one polity drop of 3 points in their autocracy score, a significant
deepening of their autocracy on more than one occasion in their history. There are only 9
of these nations, and all of them went on subsequently, to become some level of
democracy by 2006. Did repeat experience with deepening autocracy predispose these
nations to less stable democracy? Well, 4 of the nations did not experience democratic
failure and 5 of them did experience democratic failure. This looks like a less than robust
argument for instability on one side of the polity scale indicating instability on the other
side of the scale. In fact, it seems an argument that some nation states are able to leave
their past behind them when they cross over into democracy. Closer examination, as is
frequently true, reveals a more nuanced view. The 5 nations that have experienced at
least one democratic failure in addition to their repeated polity drops, without exception,
all had first born democracies before or during the counterwave years. If we look at the
duration of these first born democracies, it further emphasizes the toxicity of the
counterwave years to democracy. Bolivia first birthed democracy in 1880. This first
attempt lasted until 1935, being sucked under in the first counterwave. Bulgaria's
democracy was born in 1918, just as the first counterwave was launching, and only
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endured for a year. Paraguay's first democracy was also born during the first
counterwave in 1937, but only lasted 3 years. Turkey first experimented with democracy
in 1946, but experienced democratic failure during the second counterwave. Thailand's
first attempt, during the second counterwave in 1969, only lasted 2 years before falling.
In contrast, the 4 nations that have repeated polity drops, but have not experienced
democratic failure, without exception, were all born after the end of the second
counterwave. One could reasonably argue that, since these latest experiments in first
time democracy came after the final counterwave, they have been born toward the end of
the dataset and therefore have not had equal opportunity to fail. This is certainly true, but
it should be pointed out that, with the exception of Bolivia (born well before the first
counterwave in 1880, and succumbing to it after a duration of 56 years as a democracy),
all the other countries' first attempts at democracy lasted between 1 and 8 years. Even
with the very newest first born democracy with no democratic failure experience, a time
span of 16 years has passed between the onset of democracy and the end of the study.
The evidence, therefore, seems to point more in the direction of the toxicity of the
counterwaves.
Repeated experiences with autocracy
While repeated autocratic polity drops are one way to measure instability on the
autocratic side is to look at the number of countries that have only experienced autocracy
for once in their history. Out of the 149 nation states that have, at one time or another,
been autocracies, we find 73 experience autocracy only once. Of these, 28 were still
autocracies at the end of the study and another 13 were countries that had gone out of
existence. The remaining nations transitioned from autocracy to democracy, and while
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they might have experienced variance in the degree of autocracy or the degree of
democracy, they did not cross the border back into autocracy after their democratization.
In terms of stability, it might also be interesting to note that of the 73 nation states that
only experienced autocracy one time, 56 experienced autocracy for more than 15 years.
Autocratic deepening and democratic failure
We've already examined the relationship between repeat polity drops and
democratic failure, but what of those nations that only experienced autocratic deepening
once. Is there any evidence linking autocratic deepening and democratic failure?
In fact, we find a very high number of nation states that have experienced polity
drops as autocracies also experience democratic failure. This, of course, presumes a
transition to democracy. Of the 52 nations that have experienced polity drop, 16
experienced democratic failure because they never transitioned to democracy.
The remaining 36 nations did make the transition to democracy. Of these, only 10
have no experience with democratic failure. When we look at these 10 democracies, with
a history of polity drop but with no history of subsequent democratic failure, we find that
9 out of 10 of these democracies were born after the end of the second counterwave. The
most mature of this group is El Salvador, born in 1984, while the youngest is Burundi's
dissonant democracy, born in 2005. It remains to be seen, whether the lack of democratic
failure in these newer democracies is due to core differences in democracies born after
the counterwaves, versus the democratic path traveled by those pre-counterwave or
whether, in the more pessimistic view, these democracies have not yet existed long
enough to face the challenges that will bring about their downfall.

What, then, is the impact of a history of autocratic deepening upon democracies?
Should we assume that the experience of a polity drop while an autocracy deepens the
autocratic legacy when a nation transitions to democracy? For this to be the case, we
would expect to find the polity drops occurring first, then a nation's experience with
democratic failure. If we further examine the subset of nations that have experienced
both autocratic and democratic polity drops, we see that this is the case only some of the
time. In fact, 8 of the 26 nations first experienced democratic failure and then
experienced a polity drop as an autocracy.19 If anything, these cases seem to indicate a
continued legacy for democratic failure, as injurious to the nation state. Or, one might
simply conclude that the polity is equally prone to instability as an autocracy and a
democracy. In this case, however, one would expect to see more equal numbers between
autocratic polity drops and democratic failures.. .assuming the time spent at each was
roughly equivalent. Instead, we do not observe this to be true. What then can we take
away from this endeavor?
We can't derive from this that autocratic polity drop is the precursor of
democratic failure. While it highly correlated with the experience of democratic failure,
there are many democratic failures that have no polity drops in their history. By contrast,
as we have seen there are few nations that experience polity drop, but escape democratic
failure, especially if the democracy was born before 1977.
19

It is good to bear in mind that democratic failure and autocratic deepening are different phenomenon.

For example, if a democracy has a polity score of 6, then the following year dips to 0, and then down to -6,
this is only recorded as a deepening of the democratic failure, and not as an occurrence of autocratic
deepening.
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Democratic failure and repeated autocratic deepening
Are democratic repeat offenders comprised mostly of those that have experienced
at least one polity drop? Of the 34 nations that have repeatedly failed at democracy, only
29% have experienced an autocratic polity drop. We might also ask how many of the
repeat offenders within the autocratic polity drop camp have then experienced
democratic failure, an extremely fair question since all of the repeat autocratic deepening
camp had experienced democracy by 2006? Five of the 9 nations that experienced
multiple autocratic polity drops also experienced democratic failure, although only 2
nations, Turkey and Thailand, have the distinction of being repeat offenders for both
autocratic polity drop and democratic failure.

Conclusion
What can we take away from our study of autocratic deepening? First of all, we
know that autocracies get worse in a disproportionate way, during the counterwaves.
This forwards our argument of the wide impact of the counterwaves, both geographically
and in terms of polity type. The subtypes of autocracy have fluctuated across time. We
also have discovered that autocratic deepening is more likely to take more than a year, as
opposed to the shorter failure times for democracies. In addition, we have shown that
autocracy, as a whole, has experienced more incidences of instability than has
democracy. This holds true even when we account for autocracy's sway on the world for
much of the nineteenth century. The broad shifts that have occurred in autocracy point to
the larger picture of change in the international system and are a perfect segue into our
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concluding chapter, where we will recap the main findings of our study in a comparative
manner, while tying them to the ideas that form their roots.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The move to modernity inexorably linked new ideas and governance. With the
onset of modernity, the days when bloodlines determined capacity to rule were limited.
A fundamental paradigm shift in the ideas of legitimacy reigned. This postEnlightenment move away from fundamental assumptions about the working of the
universe carved a great divide in history. On the other side of this chasm, democracy and
antidemocracy were both alive and well. Democracy approached the problem of how to
replace the divine by locating it fundamentally in all people. The rule of the many, the
downtrodden idea across previous centuries, began an inexorable ascendance.
Institutions had evolved to mitigate democracy's failings. Legislatures were elected,
giving the masses a voice in rule without involving them in the daily particulars.
Regularized elections cycles, rights for the opposition, freedom of expression and
constraints upon authority all served to tame democracy's "capricious" nature, making
democracy safe for the world and ensuring a departure from mob rule. Rule by the many
is undergirded by fundamental assumptions of the equality of men. Democracy, in
moving away from the divine right of kings, crowned every person a ruler and a
kingmaker.
And yet, if democracy located the move away from divine rule in the equality of
individuals, antidemocratic ideas also evolved with the onset of modernity. Some strains,
such as communism, had clear ideological components, while the ideology of autocracy
was more subtle in other variants, such as some branches of fascism. They are united,
however, by their universal paternalism. Far from democracy's advocacy for liberty and

equality, antidemocracy baldly proclaims, "Father knows best." While for communism
this was to be a time delimited phase (one from which it never experientially escaped,
whatever the ideology), the fact remains that all antidemocratic sentiment unites in its
fundamental assumption that "the many" cannot govern themselves into a better
existence. When democracy fails, paternalism invariably wins. The age old critiques of
democracy as Utopian and unstable and of "the many" as incompetent are recycled as
democratic failure permeates the international system.
Much is explained by the varying historical context of CW1 compared to CW2.
The first counterwave, 1922-1940, was a true battleground of ideas. Fascism, with its
strongly centralized form of governance, was on the march, offering stability in an
uncertain time. Communism, on the other hand, was often what sparked fascism's
advance. Reacting against the purely revolutionary zeal of a fundamentally socially
destabilizing ideology, fascism's stability seemed preferable to democracy's weakness,
which after all allowed communists freedom of even vitriolic speech, especially in light
of the post-conflict challenges of World War I and the economic depression that had
gripped the world. The first counterwave occurred in the midst of great uncertainty at a
time when democracy seemed not to know the right answers. Of course, Hitler's
aggressive march across Europe, taking over high level democracies hand over fist,
contributed a great deal. Still, the first counterwave went beyond Europe's borders, as
Latin American democracies also took a nosedive toward fascism.
The second counterwave, 1957-1977, reflected more uncertainty in the
international system, again in the context of competing ideologies. The conclusion of
World War II set off a process whereby former colonies clamored for independence.

This was most pronounced in Africa and Southeast Asia. These newly independent
colonies embarked on a struggle for national identity in a bipolar world. On one side
were the colonizers of the West, on the other an upstart power with a new identity but a
long history. Dividing the globe between them, these 2 poles held vastly different
ideologies. The Soviet Union was evangelistic in it support of spreading communism.
Gladly lending a hand in the inculcation of communism to the masses, the U.S.S.R. held
newly independent nations in their tutelage, even when it did not absorb them entirely.
On the other hand, the West (represented largely by the United States) took a different
approach. Instead of supporting new democracies, the West committed to defending
existing ones. The drawbridge was raised, and while those inside democracy's castle
were to be defended, it was not the time to sally forth and spread democracy. Ironically,
democracy's strongest governments believed some of the time honored critiques about
her.. .namely, that democracy is an unstable and Utopian entity in times of uncertainty. In
other words, democracy is not for everybody at every time. Instead, autocrats with
friendly dispositions toward Western interests were cultivated while democratic
movements were squelched.1 The light of confidence in the democratic ideal burned
dimly even in high level Western democracies during the second counterwave.
Collectively, a defensive stance was taken as the threat of communism loomed large and
Western nations seemed ill-equipped to deal with the challenge.
1

Nick Culather, Secret History: The CIA 's Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).

1952-1954

Summary of Findings
This work's primary intent has been to describe the macro level trends of
democratic failure, a topic that has received scant attention. While others have described
the challenges facing nations who commit to this process of moving toward democracy,
the impact of backward movement resembles a little studied whirlpool. Its impact on the
collective ship of state has not been adequately uncovered. This study, while not
addressing all of the complexities, has put this water feature on the map. It has done so in
2 ways, by looking at the clustering of democratic failure across time as well as by
examining democracy in different concentrations. In this final chapter, I will first
summarize the main findings, discuss the implications of this work and then suggest
directions of fruitful future research.
The counterwaves
The counterwave time periods, 1921-1940 (CW1) and 1957-1977 (CW2), were
clusters of antidemocratic sentiment, times when the world system rejected the
democratic ideal, instead being lulled by the siren song of autocracy. This is true of all
polity types, as all levels of democracy experienced failure while autocracies deepened.
Failures within the counterwaves were deep, occurred quickly, and more typically
consisted of regime change as opposed to internal repression. The time that it took for
the failures to occur was similar inside and outside the counterwaves, but the peak level
of failure was steeper inside the counterwave than for failures that occurred outside the
counterwaves.
The counterwaves were a widespread geographic phenomenon. This is especially
true when looking at those nations that experienced negative polity change within the
counterwave time bands, but holds true as well for those who reached failure threshold.
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Looking at the global nature of the counterwaves again buttresses the argument that these
are systemic phenomena. When looking at the percentages of total failures that occurred
within the counterwaves, 61% of all high level democratic failures occurred within these
time bands. At the other end of the spectrum are autocratic deepenings, with 40% of all
autocratic deepenings occurring within the counterwave years. From high level
democratic failure all the way down to autocratic deepening, a striking number of failures
occurred within the counterwaves, justifying the statement that these time bands truly
were the ebb of democracy's flow.
When comparing the 2 counterwaves, there are important similarities and
differences. The composition is strikingly similar, as far as universality of impact on all
types of polities. The geography, however, is somewhat different. The epicenter for the
first counterwave was Europe (19 failures), but antidemocratic sentiment reverberated to
Latin America (14 failures), Africa (2 failures), and the Middle East (1 failure). In fact,
of all the existent democracies in 1921 only 25% would avoid failure during the first
counterwave. CW1 was particularly harsh for high level democracies. While no new
high level democracies were born during the first counterwave, well over half the world's
high level democracies failed during this time band.
The epicenter for the second counterwave was Africa (27 failures), but its reach
was more global. As new nation states had been born through the process of
decolonization, the number of democracies in the world system rose as well.
Democracy's forward momentum foundered in the second counterwave, as democratic
failure swept through Latin America (15 failures), Asia (15 failures), the Middle East (11
failures) and even Europe (7 failures). While the impact of the second counterwave was
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not so catastrophic on democracy's birth rate, the taint still remained. Democracies were
born during the counterwave, but they faced a future of failure more often than not.
Not only was the geography different for the counterwaves, there were distinctly
different mechanisms of failure as well. The first counterwave featured a clear external
component, with external takeovers being the highest of any time in history. In contrast,
during the second counterwave coups were the clear dominant mechanism, across all
types of democratic failure.
In addition, there were varying changes in autocracy. During the first
counterwave, there was a spike in high level autocracy. Also of note, in evaluating the
toxicity of the first counterwave to democracy, no high level democracies were born in
this time band. In contrast, during the second counterwave, the spike occurred not in
high level autocracy but in mid-level autocracy. High level democracies were born
during this time span, although these nation states also seem tainted by their birth time
since 61% of the high level democracies born during the second counterwave had failed
by 2006. Both the degree of spike in autocracy and the birth rate of high level
democracies point to the different impact of the second counterwave when compared to
the first. In a real sense, the second counterwave appears to be less toxic to democracy
than the first.
These points of contrast offer interesting implications. The first counterwave, at
first glance, seems more toxic. In one sense, this is true when considering factors like the
spike in high level autocracy and the complete lack of new high level democracies. What
the second counterwave lacked in comparative depth, a minor distinction to be sure since
the failures were still very deep, it made up for in breadth. One might add that the second
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counterwave has also highlighted more intractable issues for democratic failure. While
those nation states in the first counterwave are now strikingly democratic, those in the
second counterwave still face significant challenges.
All of this analysis points to the distinctiveness of the counterwave time periods.
They are times when democracies experienced failures and when autocracies deepened as
well. They also offer compelling evidence that democratic failure, far from being an
isolated internal event, has been tied to macro processes in the international system, a
concept that deserves much more attention and in-depth analysis from scholars.
Repeat offenders and durability
The counterwaves feature democratic failure and autocratic deepening with a
wide geographic scope. While the geographic epicenter shifted from Europe to Africa, a
significant subset of nation states experienced a significant drop in polity score in both
counterwaves. South America, significant portions of Europe, and Central America,
were impacted by CW1 and CW2. Significant portions of these regions experienced
failure multiple times.
Repeat offenders in democratic failure are not confined solely to the counterwave
years. In looking through a wider lens at the issue of a nation's repeated attempts at
democratic governance, we find a stunning number impacted by repeated democratic
failure. Of the 148 incidences of democratic failure from 1800-2006, 100 are incidences
of democratic failure by repeat offenders. Of even more concern for democracy
advocates, repeat offenders permeate every level of democracy. In other words,
achieving high level democracy is no guarantee that a nation state will be freed from a
history of repeated democratic failure. Greece, Pakistan, Lesotho, Turkey, and France

are just some of the examples of high level democracies that have experienced multiple
democratic failures.
To further demonstrate the dominance of repeated democratic failure, we can look
at the destiny of the 48 nation states that only experienced democratic failure once. Of
those 48, 15 did not repeat democratic failure because they never recovered any level of
democracy. For these nation states, democratic failure plunged them into autocracy from
which they had not emerged by 2006.
These overwhelmingly high numbers of nation states that fail, then recover
democracy, then fail again would seem to reinforce the historic concerns about
democracy's stability. Of great concern is the durability of mid-level and low level
democracy. Few are the historic cases of these lower concentrations of democracy
serving as temporary stopping off places on the road to high level democracies. Instead,
especially since the onset of CW2 in 1957, low level and mid-level democracies have
demonstrated an alarming lack of durability. Of course, not all democracies have
experienced failure. In particular, level 10 democracies have proven resilient to many
challenges. Mitigating this optimism, however, is the fact that only 5 non-Western, nonisland countries have reached this threshold.
Still, the overall durability of the very highest level democracy brings some
comfort to democracy advocates. In addition, democracies of all levels have historically
seen lower numbers of severe disturbances than their autocratic counterparts. When it
comes to external takeovers, civil wars, and the descent into failed states, autocracies
have outnumbered their democratic counterparts. However, democratic failures
experience a uniform volatility that is of great concern.

Fast and far
The findings for democratic failure vary across high level, mid-level and low
level democracy, but some findings unite democratic failure in all its manifestations.
These statements are true within the counterwave years, and outside of them as well.
When they fail, democracies overwhelmingly fail fast and far. This statement is true for
high level democratic failure, where a slow gradual decline was rare. Mid-level failures
feature the most precipitous decline as a polity type, although all 3 concentrations of
democracy failed an average of a year to a year and a half. This is in stark contrast to
autocratic deepening, which took an average of twice as long to drop 3 polity points, as
can be seen in Table 8.

Table 8. Average years taken to reach failure threshold
POLITY TYPE
YEARS TO FAILURE THRESHOLD
High Level Democracy
1.5
Mid Level Democracy
1.1
Low Level Democracy
1.6
Autocracy
3.4

Not only do democracies of all concentrations fail quickly, they also fail deeply.
As can be seen in Table 9, the average democratic failure for high level, mid-level and
low level democracies was enough to take all types of democracy over into autocracy.
Democratic failure, then, has not been prone to a slow erosion of democratic institutions.
Across time and across polity type, democratic failure has been both precipitous and
deep. This is true especially within the counterwaves, when the depth of the failures is
deepest.
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Table 9. Average depth of failure for all types of democracy
POLITY TYPE
DEPTH OF FAILURE
High Level Democracy
-13 points
Mid-Level Democracy
-9 points
-7 points
Low Level Democracy

Mechanism of failure
Adding further to the understanding of democracy's vulnerability is the
mechanism of democratic failure. There are 4 basic ways that democratic failures occur:
civil war, external takeover, internal repression and coup. Of course, the context to each
of these occurrences is complex and would serve as a rich arena for further research.
Still, even from this cursory look, important similarities and differences emerge, as
shown in Graph 17.
If we look simply at high level democratic failures, we find the dominant
mechanism of democratic failure is different for each time band considered. In the first
counterwave, external takeovers predominate, echoing the historical context of Hitler's
march through Europe. During the second counterwave, coups are the dominant
mechanism of failure. Again, this is shaped by the historical context of instability during
the decolonization time span that took place within a bipolar world that was quite hostile
to new democracies. Outside the counterwaves, internal repression becomes the leading
mechanism for high level democratic failure. High level democracy, then, has had
varying points of vulnerability depending on the historical context.
Dissonant democracy has more consistent vulnerabilities. For mid-level democracy,
coups predominate regardless of time band. Low level democracy also shows real
2

It would be interesting to push the research in the direction of greater statistical analysis. This could be
achieved simply by looking at multiple regressions that examine the relationship of legislative deadlock
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Graph 17. Mechanisms of failure for all types of democracy.

vulnerability to coups as the dominant mechanism of failure during the second
counterwave, as is true of both high level democratic failure and mid level democratic
failure for this same time period. Outside of CW2, low level democratic failure is split
almost evenly between coups and internal repression.
One further point, regarding the mechanisms of failure, is the concentration of
civil war. While civil war is not a dominant mechanism of democratic failure at any
point of time, it does occur in greater concentrations at certain times. For example, in the
first counterwave more than 10% of mid level democratic failures were due to civil war.
and propensity to move toward democratic failure via each of the mechanisms. There are, of course, many
other independent variables that could be considered.
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Graph 18. Polity type as percentage of world system.

For the second counterwave, this is true of high level democracies. Outside the
counterwaves, low level democracies are the most prone to civil war. These varying
mechanisms point to certain characteristics of democracy's vulnerability, a topic which
leads us to ponder the implications of all the findings in this study.

Implications
There have been significant changes in the world system from the beginning of
the study in 1800, until its end in 2006. As shown in Graph 18, the dominant polity types
have shifted dramatically over the course of the time studied. In 1800, high level

autocracy was the dominant polity type, with mid level autocracy close behind. High and
mid-level democracy was non-existent, and low level democracy was the choice of
governance for less than 10% of the nation states in the world system. In direct contrast,
in the year 2006, over 40% of the nation states in the world system are some type of
democracy, with high level democracy as the dominant share. High and low level
autocracy has faded into near oblivion. Of greater concern, however, to democracy
advocates is the utter resilience of mid-level autocracy across the entire time span under
study. While high level autocracy has decreased its market share dramatically, mid-level
autocracy remains stubbornly viable.
It is clear that democracy's victory is far from complete. The majority of nation
states in the world system still live under some sort of autocracy, while only roughly a
quarter of all nation states experience high level democracy. This study also implies the
tenuous nature of democracy's gains. Democracy's rapid and deep failures, both within
the counterwave years and outside these time bands, countenance caution.
This study has also highlighted the importance of studying democratic failure at
the macro level of analysis. Without analysis at the systemic level, clusters of democratic
failure and autocratic deepening are impossible to recognize. The toxicity of these time
bands to democracy is impossible to detect if democratic failure is analyzed solely by a
case study approach.
In addition, while much has been made in the case study approach to democratic
failure of the complexities of the internal political environment, little attention has
focused on the impact of the international environment. The counterwaves suggest
system wide disturbances in the power of the democratic ideal. The impact of
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fluctuations in the international economic environment, the role of conflict and postconflict rebuilding efforts, and the arena of state-building are just a few fruitful arenas to
examine more closely in future academic examinations of the counterwave phenomena
and democratic failure in general. With the descriptive work of this study completed, a
next step could begin the work of looking for correlations. Key to all of this is the
interaction of the international system, the nation state, and local actors.
Certainly democratic failure is usually intimately tied to the internal environment
of a nation state, but even this is not universal. As we have seen in the case of external
takeovers, democratic failure can occur simply with an external takeover. While the
viability of externally "imposed" democracy has been a controversial topic, who would
argue that democratic failure can only happen with internal elements? Hitler put such
arguments to rest with some finality.
Even in a world with Hitler safely dead, important changes have occurred that
point to a greater role for forces external to the nation state. The world in which we live
is different in some fundamental ways. There are at least 3 important ways that life in the
twenty first century is different.
First of all, the speed of life is different. Information is relayed with lightning
speed, on news outlets, via the internet, and through instant messages. In this age of
information transference, will there also be a more easily transferred political agenda?
Will the instability in one nation have greater spillage across borders and even across
continents? If democracy fails in one state, will another state be less likely to attempt
reform? If democracy breaks out in one nation will a neighboring autocratic nation take
repressive steps to shore up its rule, in a sort of anticipatory reaction?
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The second point, then, is that events occur before an audience. Now, more than
ever, there concept of a global stage is reality. In some sense, since democracy's victory
with the fall of the Soviet Union, this has largely worked to constrain behavior. In the
post-Tiananmen Square world, we've seen peaceful transitions where in the past military
force would have been a more likely scenario, such as in the Orange Revolution in
Ukraine and the Rose Revolution in Georgia.3
This is likely due to the third point, which is that democracy now has normative
power in the international system. While democracy has not dominated all nation states,
in some sense even dictators feel constrained to pay it lip service, in a way that never
occurred in the past.
What do we do with these differences? Do we, then, discount the idea of
antidemocratic clusters as something consigned to the past? Is democracy's victory so
permanent that we need not concern ourselves with democratic decline as rapid and
steep? Will democracy as a force in the international system mitigate against precipitous
democratic failures? There is certainly no evidence of this in the cases of more recent
democratic failures, such as Thailand, Fiji, Nepal and Guinea-Bissau. There may,
however, be an argument that the democratic norm has had a mitigating effect on those
nation states that are more constrained by the international system, such as Venezuela and
Russia, who have indeed experienced a slower decline in polity scores.
As the democratic ideal has so forcefully demonstrated, norms are not static in the
international system. If the dramatic transitions of 1989-1991 demonstrated anything
they demonstrated that norms can change rapidly. There are big players, especially
3

Unfortunately, as of this writing, democracy is far from certain in either of these examples. If anything,
they seem likely to serve as future case studies for democratic failure.

Russia and China, in the international system whose commitment to democratic
governance flies in the face of the democratic norm. China especially, if it manages to
overcome the challenges of the remnants of its state economy, could be poised to offer an
alternative to high level democracy.
This, of course, takes us back to the idea that ideas matter. Whether you think of
them as causative agents of change, or merely as indicators of the convergence of forces
already at work, ideas serve as signposts signaling change. The counterwave years were
times of uncertainty and of the competition of conflicting ideas. During the first
counterwave, democracy retreated to fascism in the fight against communism. In the
second counterwave, democracy opted for a containment policy. While the traditional
way to view this is a containment of communism, in reality this was also a containment
of democracy. In the face of an external threat, democracy saved itself in the countries
where it already thrived, but refused to do battle with antidemocratic ideas elsewhere, all
in the name of self-preservation.
In an increasingly complex world, where does that leave us in our thoughts about
democratic failure? Count me with the group of scholars who study political structure
but aver prophecy, an inherently risky business. Few are proven correct, many are
proven wrong. Alexis de Tocqueville, in the early nineteenth century, predicted the rise
of the United States and Russia as 2 superpowers that would be fundamentally different
in nature yet "marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe."4
We admire Tocqueville's prescience. On the other hand, Nikita Khrushchev published an
article in Foreign Affairs in 1959 predicting the triumph of socialism as practiced in the
4

As quoted in Arendt Lipjhart's World Politics: The Writings of Theorists and Practitioners, Classical
and Modern (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971), 432.
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Soviet Union as the system of governance that "will be victorious on the globe which will
offer the nations greater opportunities for improving their material and spiritual life." As I
venture where angels fear to tread, I hope to be a Tocqueville and not a Khrushchev.
Regardless of the dangers, some words contemplating the future direction of democracy
and democratic failure are in order.
The euphoria that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, has itself collapsed.
While optimism about reshaping the globe has fallen flat, confidence in autocracy and
managed governance has re-emerged. How will democracy respond to new challenges
and evolutions? In the past, when hope has been low in the international system,
democracy has suffered. Navigating the waters full of the shipwrecks of post-conflict
time periods has been especially difficult for democracy. Scholars have now broadly
concluded that the third wave of democracy is over. Meanwhile, democratic governance
has not proven to be the panacea to either poverty in Africa or the key to political
stability in that region. In spite of the gains made by democracy in Latin America, grave
concerns remain about democracy's viability in that region as well.6 Post-Soviet states
have inherited problems that democracy has not been able to entirely resolve.
Significant portions of the globe remain under the sway of autocracy, especially in the
Middle East, Africa and Asia. It is unclear, with the loss of the democratization
momentum, that autocracy will retreat in the near future, but with the increasingly
5
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7
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complex world democracy inhabits there is reason for concern about a third counterwave.
This is particularly troubling, since recent studies have linked the concept of diffusion not
Q

only to democracy, but also to democratic failure. I hope this assessment will prove to
be unduly grim. Whatever democracy's future, it will certainly be informed by the
failures in democracy's past.
8

D. Brinks and M. Coppedge, "Diffusion is no Illusion: Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave of
Democracy," Comparative Political Studies 39, no. 4 (May 2006): 463-489.
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